

On the increase of speaker–orientation from modality to mood of ‘fear’–predicates in English*

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Yae, Sunhee. 2014. On the increase of speaker-orientation from modality to mood of ‘fear’-predicates in English. *Linguistic Research* 31(1), 165-182. The aim of this paper is to address the increase of speaker-orientation from modality to mood in ‘fear’-predicates of English. ‘Fear’-predicates concerned here are *I am afraid~(I’m afraid~)* and *I fear~*, judging from the degree of grammaticalization and the token frequency of corpus data regarding the modal verbs in the subordinate clause. The first person subject ‘I’ in the construction of *I am afraid~ (I’m afraid~)* and *I fear~* signals the speaker-orientation. Modality in this paper is defined in terms of factuality to the proposition, following Narrog (2012, ch. 2). Mood is delineated as a grammatical term for modality. Based on Narrog’s (2010: 394) model, mood forms the upward stage of the grammaticalization of modality. ‘Fear’-predicates in the main clause combined with modal verbs in the subordinate clause constitute composite mood along the line of increased speaker-orientation such as imperative, admonitive, commissive, etc. It is argued that the path from modality to mood is metaphorically mapped across the domains. (Chung-Ang University)

Keywords ‘fear’-predicates, speaker-orientation, modality, mood, metaphorical mapping

1. Introduction

‘Fear’ is one of the basic human emotions. ‘Fear’-expressions develop into diverse grammatical markers. This paper deals with one of the grammatical markers which originated from ‘fear’-predicates from the grammaticalization perspective. *I am afraid~ (I’m afraid~)* and *I fear~* are grammaticalized into modality-markers

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(epistemic and evidential) and discourse markers (politeness marker, mitigator, pragmatic hedger, etc.) from the lexical level.¹ The other ‘fear’-predicates such as *I am terrified~I am frightened~I am scared~I panic~* are not much considered in this paper because these predicates show limited development on the lexical stage, and thus they are not relevant enough from the grammaticalization perspective.

This paper will address the strengthened tendency of speech acts from modality to mood of ‘fear’-predicates. For the purpose of this paper, Narrog (2005, 2010, 2012) will be presented as a theoretical base. This paper will argue that the motivation and the dynamics of changes in ‘fear’-derived modality are more complex than Traugott and Dasher (2002) argue.

2. Preliminaries

2.1 What is modality?

Let us look at the definition of modality. Narrog (2012: 6) argues that in current linguistics, there are two major approaches to the definition of modality to the proposition. The first definition is in terms of ‘speakers’ attitudes’ or ‘subjectivity’ and the second one, in terms of ‘factuality,’ ‘actuality,’ or ‘reality.’ The problem of the first definition is that if a definition through ‘speakers’ attitudes’ or ‘subjectivity’ is taken seriously, the meaning of the speakers’ attitudes is far too varied to be confined into one category label and it is impossible to identify a single grammatical category, or a definite set of categories associated with it.

As for the second definition of modality, scholars have used different technical terms such as ‘factivity’ (Lyons 1977: 794-5), ‘factuality’ (Palmer 1986: 17-8), ‘irrealis’ (Mithun 1999; Plamer 2001), ‘reality’ (Portner 2009), ‘actuality’ (Chung and Timberlake 1985; Papafragou 2000), and ‘validity’ (Kiefer 1987; 1997 & Dietrich 1992).

Following Narrog (2012: 6) in this paper, the second definition will be the base of the analysis of ‘fear’-derived modal verbs: modality is a linguistic category referring to the factual status of a proposition. Therefore, we can say that a proposition is modalized if it is marked for being undetermined with respect to its

¹ For detailed discussions, see Yae (2012).

factual status.

The term 'factual' is more appropriate than 'real,' since in philosophy 'real' is commonly understood as something existing independently of human experience and judgment (Audi 1999: 775), while the 'factual' is related to human judgment and statements that are either true or false in connection with modality (Mautner 2000: 193). Modality in this paper indicates a category that refers to non-factual states-of-affairs.

The examples in (1) and (2) will elaborate our discussions on modality based on the second definition of factuality.

- (1) The cats are happy now.
- (2) The cats must be happy now.

The example in (1) is a non-modalized, factual proposition and the example in (2) is a modalized, non-factual proposition. The sentence in (1) is portrayed as factual during the interval of time referred to. In contrast, in (2) the situation is described as purely within the realm of thought, as indeterminate with respect to its factuality, and as open with respect to its actual existence. As illustrated above, the definition of modality is based on factuality to the proposition.

2.2 Modal categories

In this section, let us look into diverse modal categories that scholars have broken modality into. Bybee et al. (1994) broach four modal categories onto epistemic modality, speaker-oriented modality, agent-oriented modality, and subordinating modality. Coates (1995) proposes modal categories with epistemic modality and root (agent-oriented or deontic) modality. Epistemic modality includes possibility and necessity while root modality subsumes permission, possibility, obligation and necessity. Heine (1995) also categorizes modality into epistemic and agent-oriented as Coates (1995) does. Palmer (2001: 8) suggests propositional modality (epistemic and evidentiality) and event-modality (deontic and dynamic). Nuyts (2006) and de Haan (2006) break modality into epistemic, deontic, dynamic modalities. In literature, some modal categories came into being and disappeared. But there has been an agreement among scholars that two main modal categories are

epistemic and deontic.

2.3 Modality based on Narrog (2010, 2012)

In this section, let us look at the modal categories of Narrog (2012, ch. 2). Narrog (2010, 2012) is motivated by the diachronic analysis of *must* and *ought to* conducted by Traugott and Dasher (2002, ch. 3). The developmental three stages of *must* and *ought to* are given in (3).

(3) Traugott and Dasher (2002, ch.3)

a. developmental cline: deontic > epistemic

b. *must*

Stage I: *must* has the meaning of ability and permission.

Stage II (late OE): *must* gains a deontic meaning of obligation.

Stage III (mid-ME): *must* develops epistemic meaning

c. *ought to*

Stage I: *ought to* denotes possession.

Stage II (late OE): *ought to* develops deontic meaning.

Stage III (early ModE): *ought to* develops epistemic meaning

Traugott and Dasher (2002, ch. 3) argue that the deontic modality has developed into the epistemic modality based on the analysis in (3a). In (3b) and (3c), *must* and *ought to* denote the lexical meanings at Stage I. At Stage II, *must* and *ought to* gain a deontic meaning. At Stage III, *must* and *ought to* evolve into epistemic modal verbs, they differ in the developmental period, though.

Bybee et al. (1994, ch. 6) argue that the shift from deontic to epistemic meaning exists outside of the well-known Indo-European languages as well, but is mainly confined to the Eurasia language area. Overall, other changes are more frequent. They include changes from obligation to imperative, from future/prediction to imperative and from root possibility to permission.

Narrog (2010) proposes the model of modality with two dimensions as shown in Figure 1 below. The first dimension is volitivity. Deontic and boulomaic modalities are included in volitive. In contrast, epistemic, evidentiality and dynamic modalities are subsumed in nonvolitive. It is assumed that bidirectional development from

volitive to non-volitive and from non-volitive to volitive are eligible. The second dimension is a scale of increasing speaker-orientation from event-orientation as upward arrows indicate. 'Event' is a cover term of events, actions, situations, states, etc. Narrog (2005: 692) claims that as speaker-orientation refers to orientation towards the speaker and the speech situation, it also accommodates an orientation towards the addressee as part of the speech situation.




Figure 1. A semantic map of modality and mood

In Figure 1, mood shapes the last stage in the grammaticalization of markers of modality. Markers of illocutionary force refer to whether an utterance is an assertion, a question, a command or an expression of a wish (Van Vallin and LaPolla 1997: 41) in Figure 1. Narrog's model in Figure 1 constitutes the motivation to analyze the modality of 'fear'-predicates, which will be addressed in the next chapter.

3. Modality of 'fear'-expressions in English

In this chapter, we will review the modality of 'fear'-expressions across the languages in the literature and discuss the modality of 'fear'-predicates in English.

3.1 Literature review on modality of 'fear'-expressions

This section will discuss the modality of cross-linguistic 'fear'-expressions. The modality with 'fear'-expressions has been the subject of multiple studies, including Palmer (2007), Yap et al. (2012), and Yae (2012). Palmer (2007: 13) argues that wishes and fears clearly express attitudes towards propositions whose factual status is not known or propositions that relate to unrealized events. Expressions of wanting, desire and preference relate to unrealized events and may be marked as irrealis. The subjunctive in the subordinate clause of Spanish in (4) and the subjunctive in the main clause of classical Greek in (5) illustrate that wanting and fears portray indeterminate factual status of the propositions.

- (4) the subjunctive in the subordinate clause as in Spanish

quiero que estudias más

I want that study+3SG+PRES+SUBJ more

'I want you to study more'

- (5) the subjunctive in the main clause as in classical Greek

mé: soús diaphéire:i gámos

Not your ruin+3SG+PRES+SUBJ marriage

'I'm afraid she may ruin your marriage'

Givón (1994: 280, as cited in Palmer 2007: 134) refers to hopes and fears as 'epistemic anxiety.' Wanting, however, seems to be different in that the emotion is more directed to the event, and so should be treated as deontic, a kind of directive. Wishes, like fears and hopes, can relate to the past as well as the present or future, whereas wanting cannot as shown in (6).

- (6) a. I wish John had come.
 b. I fear John came.
 c. I hope John came.
 d. ??I want John to have come.

Palmer (2007: 22) suggests that 'desiderative' is used for wishes and 'timitive' is eligible for fears.

Yap et al. (2012: 326-328) argue that 'fear'-verbs develop into epistemic modal adverbials, encoding *perhaps*, *maybe*, *possibly* in Cantonese, Mandarin and Malay after undergoing a syntactic movement and a phonological reduction. The examples in (7) illustrate how Mandarin *kong pa* 'fear' play a role like an epistemic modal adverbial *perhaps* and *maybe*. *Kong pa* in (7b) undergoes a phonological reduction of *wǒ* from the structure in (7a). *Kong pa* in (7c) is extraposed to the structural-final adjunct position from the structure in (7b) decoding an epistemic adverb *perhaps* and *maybe*.

(7) Mandarin *kong pa* ('fear')

- a. *wǒ kǒngpà tā bú huì lái le*
1SG fear 3SG NEG FUT come SFP
'I'm afraid/Probably s/he won't come.'
- b. *kǒngpà tā bú huì lái le*
fear 3SG NEG FUT come SFP
'I'm afraid/Probably s/he won't come.'
(≠ S/he's afraid she won't come.)
- c. *tā bú huì lái le (,) (wǒ)kǒngpà*
3SG NEG FUT come SFP 1SG fear
's/he won't come, I'm afraid / Probably.'
(≠ S/he's afraid she won't come.)

Yae (2012, ch. 3) claims that 'fear'-derived lexemes in English are grammaticalized from RL (Respect Lexeme) through EM (Epistemic Modality) to DM (Discourse Marker) based on Traugott and Dasher (2002, ch. 4).

- (8) a. A two year-old boy was horribly murdered. (RL)
- b. We were terribly lucky to find you here. (EM)
- c. Disagreeable enough (as most necessities are) but, I am afraid, unavoidable. (OED, T. Gray 1740) (DM: Pragmatic hedger)

In (8a) *horribly* designates a lexical meaning 'in a fearful manner', functioning as RL. In (8b) *terribly* does not mean 'in a fearful manner' as in *horribly* in (8a). *Terribly* in (8b) serves the purpose of an emphatic marker. *I am afraid* in (8c)

functions as a pragmatic hedger or a parenthetical element. It is syntactically excisable or transferable utterance-initially, utterance-medially or utterance-finally without causing a communicative breakdown.

Yae (2012, ch. 3) also argues that 'fear'-lexemes develop into the evidential marker. The evidential marker is subsumed under EM in this paper, as shown in (9).

(9) evidential marker² as EM

- a. I did many a thing she did not like, I'm afraid - and now she's gone! (OED, E.C. Gaskell 1853)
- b. This time, I fear, there can be no doubt - Monsieur Gebree took his own life! (BNC, GVP: 1857)

I'm afraid in (9a) and *I fear* in (9b) designate 'It is inferred that....' *I'm afraid* in (9a) and *I fear* in (9b) are employed to mark the degree of the speaker's certainty by inference. The discussions of Palmer (2007), Yap et al (2012) and Yae (2012) lead to the conclusion that 'fear'-expressions engage modality with regard to the factual status of the proposition.

In this section, 'fear'-predicates signal mainly epistemic modality, which is regarded as devoid of volition in the modal categories. 'Fear'-expressions stem from emotion. Emotion emerges automatically from the physical stimulus without any volition. Therefore, it is natural that 'fear'-predicates decode modality related with non-volition.

3.2 Corpus-analysis on the subordinate clause of 'fear'-predicates

In this section, we will have a closer look at the subordinate clause of 'fear'-modal verbs based on the COCA (The Corpus of Contemporary American English)³ word search. 'Fear'-modal verbs concerned here are the 1st person

² Opinions vary on the inclusion of evidentiality into epistemic modality. The evidential marker is categorized in epistemic modality in Yae (2012). Palmer (2001) and Nuys (2005) argue that inference of evidentiality is considered to be much more closely tied to epistemic modality than the other categories of evidentiality. Van der Auwera and Plungian (1998) include inference in epistemic modality but exclude the other evidential categories entirely from the modal categories.

³ COCA was created by Mark Davies of Brigham Young University, which contains more than 450 million words of text and is equally divided among spoken texts, fiction, popular magazines,

subject-construction to see to what degree the 'fear'-modal predicates are speaker-oriented as given in (10).

- (10) a. I am afraid that ~
b. I fear that ~
c. I am scared that ~
d. I am frightened that ~
e. I am terrified that ~
f. I panic that ~

Table 1 presents the token frequency of modal verbs in the subordinate clause of *I am afraid~I'm afraid~I fear~* under the search string given in (11).

- (11) SEARCH STRING
a. WORD(S): *I am afraid~I'm afraid~I fear that~*
b. COLLOCATES: [vm*] 04
c. POS⁴ LIST: verb.MODAL

newspapers, and academic texts. It includes 20 million words each year from 1990-2012 and the corpus is also updated regularly (the most recent texts are from Summer 2012).

⁴ POS stands for 'part of speech'.

Table 1. Modal verbs in the subordinate clause of *I am afraid~I'm afraid~I fear~*

	<i>I am afraid that ~</i>		<i>I'm afraid~</i>		<i>I fear~</i>	
	modal verb	frequency	modal verb	frequency	frequency	modal verb
1	will	53	'll	239	will	132
2	would	11	will	160	may	70
3	may	11	ca ⁵	127	would	34
4	can	10	might	78	'll	25
5	must	10	wo ⁶	75	might	20
6	might	5	would	69	can	18
7	shall	4	may	59	must	17
...
total		120		953		344

Table 2 shows us the token frequency of modal verbs in the subordinate clause of *I am terrified~I am frightened~I am scared~I panic~* under the search string in (12).

(12) SEARCH STRING:

- a. WORD(S): *I am terrified~I am frightened~I am scared~I panic~*
- b. COLLATES: [v*]
- c. POS LIST: verb.MODAL

Table 2. Modal verbs in the subordinate clause of *I am terrified~I am frightened~I am scared~I panic~*

	<i>I am terrified ~</i>		<i>I am frightened ~</i>		<i>I am scared ~</i>		<i>I panic ~</i>	
	modal verb	frequency	modal verb	frequency	modal verb	frequency	modal verb	frequency
1	will	3	will	2	will	1	will	1
2	might	1	can	1	may	1	may	1
3					'll	1	ca	1
total		4		3		3		3

Table 1 and Table 2 demonstrate that *I am afraid~I'm afraid~I fear that~I am terrified~I am frightened~I am scared~I panic~* select *will*, *can*, and *may* as the

⁵ Here 'ca' is from the negative form 'can't.'

⁶ Here 'wo' is from the negative form 'won't.'

three most common among the other modal verbs. The modality of 'fear'-verbs are related with the modal verbs, *will*, *can*, and *may* in the subordinate clause, which encode the modality of deontic, epistemic and volition.

In § 3.1, modality of 'fear'-expressions is mainly related with epistemic. This section shows the modal verbs that 'fear'-verbs select in their subordinate clause. The modal categories are somewhat related with the modal verbs. For example, *must* is included in the category of strong deontic (strong obligation) and epistemic while *may* and *can* designate weak deontic (permission) and epistemic (possibility). The modal verb *will* is counted in the category of boulomaic or volition (Palmer 1986).

This fact implies that the modality of 'fear'-predicates are diverse, ranging from epistemic to deontic and boulomaic. Therefore, it is reasonable to discuss the diverse modal phenomena of the 'fear'-predicates that cannot be confined only to the epistemic modality.

4. Mood of 'fear'-predicates

4.1 Modality toward mood

Let us discuss the modality and mood of 'fear'-predicates, focusing on *I'm afraid* (*I am afraid*) and *I fear*. The token frequencies of the other 'fear'-verbs, *I am terrified*~/~*I am frightened*~/~*I am scared*~/~*I panic*~, are 3 or 4 as shown in Table 2, which we cannot say is meaningful in statistics. The 'fear'-verbs *I am terrified*~/~*I am frightened*~/~*I am scared*~/~*I panic*~ still retain the lexical denotation of 'I am fearful of something' while *I'm afraid* (*I am afraid*) and *I fear* have been semantically bleached a lot from the origin and grammaticalized into diverse functions.

First of all, let us have a look at the definition of mood. Mood has been delineated in various ways in literature. Nyutes (2005) argues that mood refers to utterance types such as indicatives, interrogatives, subjunctives, imperatives, optatives, etc. Nuytes (2005) also claims that modality is semantic, but mood is grammatical, with the same relationship as temporality to tense. The modal verb develops 'upward' from modality into mood, increasing speaker-orientation based on Narrog's model of Figure 1.

The examples in (13) show the epistemic modality of *I am afraid*~, encoding 'It

is likely that~, 'It seems that~' and 'probably.'

- (13) a. I am afraid that it might not be there when I get back.
(COCA, Link, Kelly. 2001)
b. But your being so weak and being obliged to lie in bed so much,
I am afraid you can not bear. (COCA, Laslett, Peter. 1991)
c. I fear you may be right.

The examples in (13) are characterized as evidential modality, indicating 'It is inferred that~.'

- (14) a. I did many a thing she did not like, I'm afraid — and now she's gone! (OED, E.C. gaskell 1853)
b. This time, I fear, there can be no doubt — Monsieur Gebree took his own life! (BNC, GVP: 1857) (=9))

Must is a modal-marker signalling deontic or epistemic. But in (15) *must* functions as the mood-marker, increasing speaker-orientation, moving from modality to mood: from strong obligation to imperative.

- (15) from an obligation marker in second person to an imperative
a. You must call your mother. (Bybee et al. 1994: 211)

Before we get to the point of 'fear'-mood markers, one thing to note is that Bybee et al. (1994: 214-5), following Lyons (1977: 807) and Coates (1983), use the term 'modally harmonic' for situations in which a modal verb and another word or phrase express the same degree of modality. The harmonic combinations of the two elements seem to be in concord, rather than doubling the modal effect. For example, the modal verb *may* is in harmony with the adverb *possibly* denoting possibility in (16a) but in disharmony with the adverb *certainly* denoting epistemic in (16b). In (16a) *He may possibly come* expresses the same degree of certainty as *He may come*. In contrast, nonharmonic combination of the modal verb *may* and the adverb *certainly* forces an interpretation in which one modal has a wider scope than the other as in the example of (16b).

- (16) a. He may possibly come.= He may come.
 b. He may certainly come. (*certainly* has a wider scope than *may*)

In (16b) epistemic *certainly* has a wider scope than *may*. As a result, *may* in (16b) is interpreted as permission, not as possibility.

Now we get back to our main discussion. Based on § 3, we will look at the construction with 'fear'-predicates in the main clause and the other modal verbs in the subordinate clause. 'Fear'-predicates originate from emotion. 'Fear'-emotion automatically emerges from the physical stimulus outside. Given that 'fear'-predicates originate from emotion, they are in harmonic combination with epistemic and evidential modality, discussed in (13) and (14).

In contrast, the following discussions show nonharmonic combinations of the two modal elements. In line with the discussion of (15), the examples in (17), (18) and (18) show that *I am afraid* and *I fear* develop from modality into mood. That is, the speaker 'I' imposes some procedures to take on the second person subject 'you' in the subordinate clause in (17) and (18) or on the speaker 'I' in the subordinate clause in (19).

- (17) speaker-oriented prohibitive and imperative
 a. I'm afraid you can't come in. (COCA, Robert J. Howe 2005)
 b. I'm afraid you can't play basketball here. (May Gordon 1996)
 c. I fear you must wait in closer confinement till I come back.
 (The green branch, 1987)
 d. I fear that you must learn a lesson.⁷

Prohibitive in (17a, b) is another name of a negative imperative. (17c) and (17d) are the examples of imperative. The examples in (17) show that the speaker 'I' commands something to the addressee 'you'. The speaker 'I' orders the addressee 'you' 'not to come in' in (17a), 'not to play basketball here' in (17b), 'to wait in closer confinement' in (17c), and 'to learn a lesson' in (17d).

Admonitive is a speech act in which the speaker persuades and encourages the addressee to do something good for the addressee him(her)-self in a positive tone.

⁷ The interpretation of (17d) is ambiguous between imperative and epistemic.

The speaker 'I' in (18) nearly or absolutely threatens the addressee 'you'. That is caused by the inherent and etymological meaning of 'fear'-predicates. 'Fear'-predicates inherently s-select⁸ negative proposition except when they function as emphatic markers. The speaker 'I' advises the addressee 'you' 'not to be in danger' in (18a), 'not to regret' in (18b), and 'not to live to regret it' in (18c).

(18) speaker-oriented admonitive

- a. Be careful, Patience, I'm afraid you may be in danger. (COCA, Catwoman 2004)
- b. I am afraid you will have a great many regrets if you continue on this way.
- c. I fear you may live to regret it, Gregan. Gregan was startled by this. (BNC: Callanish 1985)

The speaker 'I' in (19) commits the speaker 'I' to take action.

(19) speaker-oriented commissive

- a. I am afraid I must go.
- b. I'm afraid I can't offer you coffee. (Laura A. H. DiSiverio 2011)
- c. I fear I must put an end to our chat. (Bruce Alexander 2000)
- d. I fear I can not help you.

The speaker 'I' lets the addressee know the speaker's volition 'to go' in (19a), 'not to offer the addressee coffee' in (19b), 'to put an end to their chat' in (19c), and 'not to help the addressee' in (19d).

In the examples of (17), (18) and (19), *I'm afraid* and *I fear* do not mean the epistemic modality, designating 'It seems that ~', 'It is likely that~', 'maybe', 'perhaps'. The speakers in (17), (18) and (19) deliver something more than the mental activity of just thinking to the addressee. In (17), (18) and (19), *I'm afraid* and *I fear* function as attenuators, softening the utterance tone. But the utterance types are mainly adjusted by the modal verbs, *must*, *can*, *will* and *may* in the subordinate clauses. The speaker 'I' asks the addressee to take action in (17) and (18) or commits

⁸ Here 's' in s-select stands for 'semantically.'

the speaker 'I' to take action in (19), attenuating an assertive strength. The examples in (17), (18) and (19) are, therefore, speaker-oriented. The examples in (17), (18) and (19) can also decode prohibitive, imperative, admonitive and commissive moods moving on from modality, increasing speaker-orientation.

The discussions so far can be summarized in Table 3 below.

Table 3. The path of development from 'fear'-predicates

Stage I		Stage II		Stage III	
'fear'-predicate	>>	modality-marker	>>	mood-marker	
non-volitive		non-volitive		volitive	

Based on Narrog's model in Figure 1, 'fear'-predicates evolve from non-volitive at Stage I to non-volitive at Stage II and from non-volitive at Stage II to volitive at Stage III increasing speaker-orientation. The path shown in Table 3 proves that changes and dynamics of modal meaning are more complex than Traugott and Dasher (2002, Ch. 3) argue.

4.2 Metaphorical mapping

Metaphor is conceptualized as involving one domain with another. Cross-domain changes look discontinuous and abrupt. But source and target meanings of metaphors constrain each other experientially.

The developmental path of 'fear'-predicates in Table 3 is metaphorically mapped across the domains as schematically presented in Table 4.⁹

Table 4. Metaphorical mapping of 'fear'-predicates onto the developmental path

Stage I		Stage II		Stage III	
emotion	>>	mental world	>>	world of speaking	
content	>>	reasoning	>>	speech acting	

Stage I is drawn in the domain of emotion. Stage II operates in the domain of

⁹ Traugott and Dasher (2002: 77, as cited in Sweetser 1990: 30) suggest that the modal verb *may* can be said to operate in three domains synchronically: I. sociophysical world ("content") > II. mental world (reasoning) > III. world of speaking (speech acting).

the mental world while Stage III works in the domain of the world of speaking. Stage I is the source domain of the target of Stage II. Stage II also works as the source domain of the target of Stage III in Table 4.

5. Conclusion

This paper has sketched out the wide range of arguments over modality itself and cross-linguistic approaches to modality over 'fear'-expressions. 'Fear'-predicates has increased speaker-orientations and developed into mood-markers from modality-markers. 'Fear'-predicates at Stage I retain lexical meanings and non-volitive meanings. 'Fear'-predicates at Stage II develop into modality markers mainly involved with epistemic. Epistemic modality is included in non-volitive semantics. 'Fear'-predicates at Stage III evolve into mood-markers, indicating the speech-type of imperative, admonitive, and commissive, closely bound with volitive. The changes of 'fear'-predicates extend from non-volitive at Stage I to non-volitive at Stage II and from non-volitive at Stage II to volitive at Stage III. Traugott and Dasher (2002) cannot clarify the path in Table 3. That is the motivation to adopt Narrog's model in Figure 1. It is argued that the path is metaphorically mapped across the domains. The schema given in Table 3 may look a little far-fetched in the middle of the absence of more abundant data. Closer investigations are awaited with regard to the in-depth research with the diachronic and synchronic data of 'fear'-predicates.

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