Overtones of the progressive*

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This paper proposes a way to explain three overtones of the progressive systematically. It has been reported that the progressive evokes overtones such as temporariness, reproof and insincerity. Previously, there have been attempts to explain them separately or partly but they could not address how the three overtones are related to one another. This paper claims that the overtones are basically derived as a scalar implicature since the simple tense and the progressive tense constitute a strength scale and the stronger form of the simple tense is negated when the weaker form of the progressive is employed, as Hong (2013) suggests for temporariness. Developing Hong (2013), this paper claims that the diversity of the overtones arises since different modal forces are added when the meaning of the stronger form is negated. (Mokpo National University)

Keywords progressive, scalar implicature, insincerity, reproof, temporariness

1. Introduction

It has been widely known that the progressive generates various overtones. Zegarac (1989, 1991, 1993) claims that the sentences in (1a), (1b) and (1c) can derive the overtones of reproof, insincerity and temporariness, respectively.

(1) a. Kate is always feeding the street cats.
   b. Kate is being patient.
   c. Kate is living in Philadelphia.

Discussing the overtones of the progressive above, Zegarac (1993) resorts to the relevance theory to explain them. Yet, his explanation lacks systematicity for

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the three overtones associated with the progressive. This paper will develop the limitation by claiming that the three overtones above are systematically linked to one another since they arise when scalar implicatures are produced with varying modal forces.

The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 will discuss the semantics of the progressive and conclude that the overtones of the progressive at issue cannot entirely be explained semantically. Section 3 will introduce Zegarac’s studies to see what the overtones of the progressive are and how they were dealt with in the literature. Section 4 will propose a new account for the three overtones of the progressive based on Hong (2013). Section 5 will discuss dynamic modality that can possibly be called a third type of modality. However, this section will support the view of Gisborne (2007) who claims that dynamic modality is not part of the modal system.

2. Semantics of the progressive

This section will discuss some representative studies that have dealt with the semantics of the progressive and the reasons why these semantic approaches cannot adequately address the three overtones of the progressive that we want to investigate in this paper.

First, Leech (1970) argues that the linguistic meanings of the progressive are two-fold. On the one hand, it denotes “limited extension of the situation in time.” For instance, Leech considers the construal of temporariness felt in (2a) as part of the intrinsic reading of the progressive. On the other hand, he also insists that the progressive in English can express the continuous sense. For instance, the sentence like (2b) tells us that the progressive delivers the meaning of “persistence of the process.” Leech (1970) himself admits that the two proposed meanings can be contradictory to each other but he claims that they are powerful enough to cancel out each other.

(2) a. Kate is living in Philadelphia.
   b. The Earth is turning on its axis.
Yet, Goldsmith and Woisetschlaeger (1982) strongly claim that there are many counter-examples to this kind of claim, in addition to the empirical problems concerning the learnability of the progressive when contradictory meanings are imposed on a single form. According to them, not only (3a) but also (3b) are felicitous utterances. However, Leech’s (1970) claim predicts that the sentences are anomalous. Their explanations are as follows. In (3a), the first clause implies that the duration of the event is not limited but the second clause expresses imminent change. In (3b), the first clause signals limited duration but the second clause emphasizes permanence. The two opposite meanings apparently do not lead to incongruity to the effect of canceling out each other, contrary to Leech’s (1970) claim.

(3) a. The Statue of Tom Paine now stands at the corner of Kirkland and College, but everybody expects the new Administration to move it.
b. The Statue of Tom Paine now is standing at the corner of Kirkland and College, but nobody thinks the deadlocked City Council will ever find a proper place.

Instead, Goldsmith and Woisetschlaeger (1982) argue for two semantic features of the progressive in English. First, they claim that the aspectual feature of non-delimitedness is encoded in the progressive. Second, they argue that the situation described with the progressive can be characterized as phenomenal while that with the simple, as structural. To be more specific, when your car breaks down and smokes, you might decide to fix it. After the repairing job, you can utter the sentence in (4a). To utter the sentence in (4b), however, you first need to start the car and you simply make a remark about the observation about the car’s condition.

(4) a. The engine doesn’t smoke anymore.
b. The engine isn’t smoking anymore.

Goldsmith and Woisetschlaeger (1982) further argue that the phenomenal semantics of the progressive is associated with the evidential reading. For instance, the sentence in (4a) with the simple tense uses the speaker’s knowledge
to delineate the functioning of the engine. However, the sentence in (4b) with the progressive is on the basis of evidence of the engine’s real functioning. Thus, another contrast they claim between the simple tense and the progressive tense is the distinction between knowledge and evidence.

However, Zegarac (1993) points out that the more precise term for “evidence” that can characterize the semantics of the progressive is “perceptible evidence” since both sentences in (4) can be used on the basis of evidence. Zegarac notes that the contrast between the two sentences in (4) can be felt since they portray different states of affairs: in the (a) sentence, the engine does not need to really work at the time of communication while the (b) sentence ordinarily encodes the matter of the engine’s real functioning at the time of communication.

Even with the further refinement on Goldsmith and Woisetschlaeger’s (1982) account, Zegarac (1993) points out a problem of their claim. According to him, it is not difficult to find cases where the progressive is used to describe an event while denying that perceptible evidence of the event’s occurrence is manifested. In the example in (5), what makes the use of the progressive possible is the speaker’s knowledge that it takes approximately five minutes for the kettle to boil. In this case, it is claimed that the concept of perceptible evidence is unavailable.

(5) I think my kettle is boiling in the kitchen (although we can’t hear anything in the living room). I switched it on five minutes ago.

On the other hand, Whitaker (1983) argues that experiential involvement can semantically describe the situation conveyed by the progressive. We can illustrate his point with the following examples. In the examples employing the progressive form, the semantics is to be claimed more experientially based rather than the semantics of the simple tense.

(6) a. Kate will be coming round the river, when she comes.
   b. Kate will be wearing silk blouse, when she comes.
   c. Kate will be riding a unicorn, when she comes.
Yet, the examples in (7) can refute Whitaker’s claim since it is hard to insist that the simple-tense counterparts of the examples in (6) are not experientially involved. The notion of experiential involvement seems to cover most of the usages of the progressive but the problem is that it does not make the progressive sufficiently contrasted with the simple tense due to their high subtlety and relativity.

(7) a. Kate will come round the river, when she comes.
   b. Kate will wear silk blouse, when she comes.
   c. Kate will ride a unicorn, when she comes.

At the level of semantics, various notions such as limited duration, (perceptible) evidence, and experiential involvement have been proposed to explain the progressive. However, none of them quite satisfactorily explains the meanings of the progressive, not alone the very nature of the three overtones of the progressive mentioned in the introduction. Thus, in the following section, we will turn to pragmatic studies that have discussed the three overtones and see how they have attempted to address them.

3. A pragmatic account

Zegarac (1993) examines the three overtones of the progressive and tries to explain them under the relevance theory. The relevance theory basically claims that speakers obtain optimal relevance if and only if they can draw legitimate effects for the efforts they put into. Under this framework, the progressive form being much more complex than the simple needs extra efforts and thus the choice of the progressive over the simple can be justified only when there are adequate effects that can compensate the extra efforts. Zegarac (1993) fundamentally maintains the position that the extra effects generated by choosing the more effort-taking form of the progressive are the overtones at issue.

For instance, Zegarac (1993) claims that the (a) and (b) utterances in (8) and (9) express almost the same information. Yet, only the (a) sentences are claimed to convey an extra overtone of mild reproof such as annoyance, dissatisfaction,
or nervousness.

(8) a. Old Lily is always feeding the pigeons.
   b. Old Lily always feed the pigeons.

(9) a. The baby is always crying.
   b. The baby always cries.

Zegarac’s (1989) explanation goes as follows. If the speaker merely intended to characterize the patterns of Old Lily and the baby, the simple tense might have been used. However, the selection of the progressive form over the simple means that the speaker intended to achieve more effects by putting more efforts in terms of the theory of optimal relevance.

At this point, the question is then why reproof? Zegarac (1993) attempts to provide the answer partly based on the fact that the (a) sentences in (8) and (9) are instances of hyperbole. He claims that our world knowledge on feeding animals and crying babies makes us to understand the sentences in (8a) and (9a) as a loose use rather than as a literal use. That is, the loose use of reproof is claimed to be generated since the hearer seeks optimal relevance based on his or her encyclopedic world knowledge. For instance, the sense of reproof in (8a) comes from the implicatures in (10) and that in (9a) from those in (11).

(10) a. Old Lily spends more time feeding the pigeons than a sensible person would do.
   b. Pigeons are not nice birds.
   c. Pigeons know how to find food and needn’t be fed by people.
   d. Pigeons are a nuisance and a health hazard.

(11) a. The baby cries so much that the speaker can hardly bear it.
   b. The speaker disapproves of the baby’s crying.
   c. The speaker is feeling apologetic about the noise made by the baby.

Yet, he also notes that the overtone of reproof does not necessarily arise all the time. If it is obvious in the context that the speaker loves pigeons and crying
babies, the mild reproof is not derived, conforming to the context. This is possible since the overtone is an implicature, not a denotation. Thus, he claims that it must be explained by a pragmatic theory, not a semantic theory.

Zegarac (1993) further claims that the interpretation of (12a) and (13a) can be paraphrased as in (12b) and (13b). Zegarac (1989) argues that the overtone of insincerity is derived in (12a) since, by conveying the linguistic meaning that John is instantiating the property of being polite, the speaker does not make a full commitment to the stronger and the more relevant proposition that John is polite. Thus, the implicature is generated that the speaker does not genuinely think that John is polite.

(12) a. John is being polite.
    b. John is instantiating the property of ‘be polite.’

(13) a. Mary is loving the fruit salad.
    b. Mary is instantiating the property ‘love fruit salad.’

Zegarac (1993) claims that the following implicatures in (14) can arise when we interpret the sentence in (12a). A similar explanation can be given to the insincerity overtone associated with the utterance in (13a) as well.

(14) a. John is insincere.
    b. John is desperate to make a good impression.
    c. John is making a great effort to conceal his real feelings.
    d. Only a fool could believe that John is really acting politely.

Also, Zegarac (1993) describes the contrast between (15a) and (16a) as the paraphrases in (15b) and (16b). The overtone of temporariness or limited duration is derived when the utterance in (15a) is interpreted in context. That is, seeking optimal relevance, the hearer stops at the first hypothesis that fits the principle of relevance: John is temporarily an inhabitant of Muswell Hill.

(15) a. John is living in Muswell Hill.
    b. An event of John’s living in Muswell Hill obtains at speech time.
(16) a. John lives in Muswell Hill.
       b. The property ‘live in Muswell Hill’ applies to John at the time of speech.

Some, like Leech (1970) as discussed in the previous section, would argue that the temporariness sense associated with the progressive might be its conventionalized linguistic meaning. Yet, Goldsmith and Woisetschlaeger’s (1982) examples repeated in (17) show us that there are cases where the temporariness overtone is not necessarily derived. If the sense of temporariness is indeed a linguistic meaning of the progressive, there should not be a case where the sense is absent at the overt use of the progressive. Thus, Zegarac (1993) argues that the example like (17a) shows us that temporariness is an implicature, not a denotation and he claims that the implicature comes because speakers communicate, seeking optimal relevance.

(17) a. The Earth is turning on its axis.
       b. The Earth turns on its axis.

4. Proposal

In the previous section, I have discussed previous studies that have attempted to account for the three overtones of the progressive. The claim that the three overtones are implicatures seems to be on the right track. However, Zegarac’s analysis based on the relevance theory lacks systematicity for the three overtones since he could only provide separate accounts for them. That is, he cannot explain how the three overtones are related to one another. Furthermore, his account is limited in the aspect that he cannot adequately explain why those specific overtones have to be generated. If the speaker wants to achieve more effects by putting into more efforts, why do they have to be those specific overtones of reproof, insincerity and temporariness, not others? A minor criticism for his account is also found with respect to the loose-use claim. He claims that (8a) and (9a) are cases of hyperbole. However, I believe, the sentences in (8b) and (9b) with the simple tense can also be regarded as examples of hyperbole.
Thus, the distinction between the loose use and the literal use does not seem to fit for the contrast between the progressive tense and the simple tense.

Instead, I find that Hong’s (2013) view on the overtone of temporariness seems more adequate. She claims that the temporariness sense of the progressive is an implicature generated by the Q principle of Horn (1984). Horn (1984) proposed two principles for implicatures: the Q principle and the R principle defined in (18).

(18) a. The Q Principle: Make your contribution SUFFICIENT:
   Say as much as you can (given both Quality and R)
b. The R Principle: Make your contribution NECESSARY:
   Say no more than you must (given Q)

According to Horn (1984), because the Q principle operates when we communicate, the hearer makes the assumption that the strongest statement that the speaker could make in the given context was uttered. Accordingly, the hearer makes the inference that a more informative statement is not legitimate, generating a scalar implicature of ‘not the stronger scale.’ Under this reasoning, the (a) sentences below elicit the implicatures stated in (b).

(19) a. It is possible Kate will come.
   b. Q-implicature: It’s not likely/not certain that Kate will come.

(20) a. Kate is as heavy as Bill.
   b. Q-implicature: Kate is not heavier than Bill.

(21) a. Kate collected most of the coins.
   b. Q-implicature: Kate did not collect all of the coins.

Along the lines illustrated above, Hong (2013) claims that the temporariness implicature is derived since the stronger meaning of the simple tense is negated when the weaker form of the progressive is used. Thus, we get the following temporariness implicature for the progressive: it is not the permanent state.

This analysis explains the overtone of temporariness as an implicature which
arises based on the Q principle. Then, how about the other two overtones: reproof and insincerity? Are they derived through different mechanisms? I claim not. I believe that the other two overtones such as reproof and insincerity arise similarly.

To develop this new account further, let us first examine the basics of the modal system. As Saeed (2009) describes, modality is a useful device that enable speakers to convey different degrees of commitment to a certain proposition. Our communication takes place based upon a general assumption that conversation participants tell the truth, to the best of their knowledge. That is, both propositions in (22a) and (22b) come with the implicit guarantee that they express the propositions “to the best of their knowledge.” Yet, modality allows speakers to reformulate or adjust this guarantee by overtly signaling stronger or weaker commitment to the conveyed propositions.

(22) a. Kate worked as a professor until she retired at the age of 65.
   b. Kate worked diligently so that her life was stable.

To dig a little bit deeper, I would like to turn to Kearns (2000) who discusses three types of modality: logical modality, epistemic modality, and deontic modality. Let us briefly look at what they are. First, the examples in (23) and (24) illustrate logical necessity and logical possibility with the former symbolized as □ and the latter as ◇. In (23), all the modal statements mean that the contained proposition is necessarily true. Yet, in (24), the modal statements express that the contained proposition is allowed to be true. Thus, in the statements in (24), the truth of the contained proposition can vary.

(23) logical necessity
   a. Necessarily, the diameter of a circle passes through the center of the circle.
   b. It is necessarily the case that the diameter...
   c. It must be the case that the diameter...
   d. The diameter of a circle must pass through the center of the circle.
   e. □ the diameter of a circle passes through the center of the circle.
(24) logical possibility
   a. Napoleon might have won at Waterloo.
   b. For Napoleon to have won at Waterloo was possible.
   c. ◇ Napoleon won at Waterloo.

Next, epistemic modality modulates the truth of a proposition “given what is already known.” Thus, epistemic modality does not guarantee the truth of the contained proposition as a fact. Its truth depends on our knowledge that can be incomplete from time to time. According to Kearns (2000), the statement in (25) expresses epistemic necessity while those in (26), epistemic possibility.

(25) Epistemic necessity
   The dinosaurs must have died out suddenly.

(26) Epistemic possibility
   a. There might/could be intelligent life in deep space.
   b. It is possible that there is intelligent life in deep space.
   c. There is possibly intelligent life in deep space.

Kearns (2000) also examines deontic modality which concerns compatibility with a set of rules. Deontic necessity as illustrated in (27) expresses what is obliged while deontic possibility illustrated in (28) expresses what is permitted.

(27) Deontic necessity
   a. You must be home by midnight.
   b. Buildings erected after September of this year are required to comply with the Revised Building Code.

(28) Deontic possibility
   a. Visitors may use the downstairs sitting room after 6 p.m.
   b. Harry is allowed to drive the tractor.

Even though there are scholars like Kearns who discuss three types of modality, distinguishing logical modality from epistemic modality, Kearns herself
notes that it is generally admitted that cases of epistemic modality can include those of logical modality, as the examples above hinted. Therefore, many scholars like Lyons (1977) classify modality into two types of epistemic modality and deontic modality. In terms of this common practice, in the following discussion, we will focus on the two types: epistemic modality and deontic modality.

The gist of my proposal concerning the two types of modality is that the two overtones of the progressive, namely reproof and insincerity, are generated when the negative meaning caused by the scalar implicature combines with either type of modal force. When deontic modality is hinted while the meaning of the simple tense is negated, we get the sense of reproof. On the other hand, the sense of insincerity arrives at when epistemic modality is involved in the negation.

In fact, there are two ways to negate modal forces. First, we can negate the modality itself symbolized as $\neg \square$ and $\neg \Diamond$. Second, we can negate the contained proposition as in $\square \neg$ and $\Diamond \neg$. As Palmer (1995) notes, $\neg \square$ and $\Diamond \neg$ are equivalent and $\neg \Diamond$ and $\square \neg$ express the same meaning. Thus, when we say that modal forces are negated, we can think about various scenarios. Among them, I would like to claim that the overtones of reproof and insincerity can be paraphrased as in (29).

(29) Modality and overtones of the progressive

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<tr>
<th>overtones</th>
<th>how the overtones are generated</th>
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<td>temporariness</td>
<td>The state of the matter is not permanent.</td>
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| reproof | (a) It is obliged that the state of the matter is not permanent. ($\square \neg$)  
(b) It is not permitted that the state of the matter is permanent. ($\neg \Diamond$) |
| insincerity | (a) It is possible that the state of the matter is not permanent. ($\Diamond \neg$)  
(b) It is not necessary that the state of the matter is permanent. ($\neg \square$) |
As summarized above, the sense of temporariness can come from negating the proposition expressed by the simple itself without any modality inserted, just as Hong (2013) argues. But the sense of reproof is derived when we negate the meaning of the simple combined with deontic modality. Since it is obliged that the state of the matter is not permanent, we get the impression that the circumstances are reproved. Or we can say that the sense of reproof that necessitates corrections is felt around since it is not permitted that the state of the matter is permanent. We generally reprove things when they should not be permanent. When it comes to generating the overtone of reproof, such adverbials as *always* and *again* seem to play a certain role and this fact is not ad hoc in this analysis since deontic modality concerns the compatibility with a set of rules that is obliged to apply all the time or again and again.

The sense of insincerity comes when epistemic modality is involved in the negation. When we say that it is possible that the state of the matter is not permanent, we can perceive the insincere feeling out of it since it is implied that the truth varies depending on the circumstances. That is, when the state of the matter is insincere, there is a possibility that it is not permanent, which corresponds to the meaning that it is not necessarily the case that the state of the matter is permanent.

To sum up the discussion so far, by extending Hong’s (2013) claim that the temporariness implicature of the progressive is derived by the Q principle of Horn (1984), we could explain the other two overtones of the progressive in a more systematic manner than relying on the relevance theory. The three overtones are all derived by the negation of the stronger meaning of the simple. Thus, we could clearly see how the overtones of the progressive are related to one another: they are derived by the same mechanism but they appear to be different simply because they employ different modality. That is, the diversity of the overtones of the progressive in English results from the fluctuation of modal forces among no modality, epistemic modality and deontic modality. This explanation is more systematic than simply claiming that the overtones are extra effects whose specific derivations are unknown.
5. Discussion

In the previous section, I have discussed that two types of modality can account for overtones of the progressive under the assumption that logical modality can easily be subsumed under epistemic modality. Even though it will not cause a big dispute when we claim that epistemic modality can cover logical modality, there were also other proposals that have identified additional types of modality. The most prominent modality that is frequently added to the two basic types of epistemic modality and deontic modality is dynamic modality. Since this paper prefers the view that minimize accidental gaps, in this section, I would like to examine dynamic modality briefly.

Palmer (1990) makes three-way distinctions of epistemic modality, deontic modality and dynamic modality, which correspond to his earlier claim about epistemic, discourse-oriented, subject-oriented modality (Palmer 1974). Perkins (1980) also identifies the three different types of modality.

To begin with, let us briefly examine what dynamic modality is claimed to be. First, Palmer (2003) identifies the third type of dynamic modality with the following examples. The distinction between dynamic modality and deontic modality can be made based on the controlling power of the subject. In sentence (31a), the event is controlled by external forces other than the subject. Thus, it is deontic in nature. On the other hand, in the sentence (31b), the controller is the subject directly. Thus, it can be characterized as dynamic, distinguished from being deontic.

(31) a. Kate can run faster than Bill.
    b. Kate will help Bill.

Huddleston and Pullum (2002) also claims that dynamic modality must be recognized as a third type of modality since they find ambiguous cases with the modal CAN. According to Huddleston and Pullum (2002), the sentence in (32a) is unambiguously deontic while the sentence in (32b) is unambiguously dynamic. However, the sentence in (32c) is ambiguous between the deontic meaning and the dynamic meaning. Thus, the two different readings should be distinguished. Yet, Gisborne (2007) contradicts this claim by asserting that the ambiguity
observed with respect to the sentence in (32c) simply shows us nothing more 
that the modal CAN is polysemous.

(32) a. Kate can stay here as long as she wants. 
    b. Kate can beat other members in the group easily. 
    c. Kate can speak Spanish.

Gisborne (2007) summarizes Huddleston and Plullum’s (2002) discussion on 
the characteristics of dynamic modality as follows.

(33) a. Dynamic modality is part of the propositional content of the clause. 
    Therefore, it is different from deontic and epistemic modality which 
take the propositional content of the clause within their scope. 
    b. Dynamic modality lacks subjectivity. Both deontic and epistemic 
    modality have subjective sense, so in this way, dynamic modality is 
different from other kinds of modality. 
    c. Dynamic modality is restricted: CAN is the only modal which clearly 
    retains a dynamic sense, although it is argued by Palmer (2003) that 
    WILL also has a dynamic meaning.

However, influenced by Foolen (1992), Papafragou (1998) and Palmer (1990), 
Gisborne (2007) claims that dynamic modality is actually not a modal, proposing 
the following properties of dynamic modality.

(34) a. Dynamic meaning is not contextual. 
    b. In dynamic modality, there is no linking of Initiator or Endpoint to 
    elements in the context. 
    c. Dynamic modality is not performative. 
    d. Dynamic modality is temporally marked, and is not temporally bound 
    to the speech event. 
    e. Dynamic modality is not subjective.

Gisborne (2007) further argues that the properties of dynamic modality listed 
in (34) directly contradict all the features below that are usually assumed for
modality in general. Thus, he concludes that meanings that are described as dynamic modality do not constitute another type of modality.

(35) a. It involves the context.
   b. The force-dynamic relations Initiator and Endpoint link to elements within the context, such as the speaker, rather than to elements within the sentence.
   c. It is performative.
   d. It is temporarily located in the speech event.
   e. It is prototypically subjective.

This section has discussed the possible third type of modality since the main proposal of this paper only depends on two types of modality. Even though some make three-way distinctions concerning modality adding dynamic modality to the basic modality systems, there are also persuasive views that refute the third type. Thus, this section has tried to justify the main claim of this paper only depending on two types of modality which are generally admitted to be major types. Yet, I would like to note that even the presence of additional types of modality does not fundamentally undermine the main proposal of this paper, since they can still be treated as accidental gaps. Even though we need to make endeavors to find ways to explain accidental gaps as much as we can, in natural languages, as a matter of fact, there are not many systems that exhaust all possibilities. Rather, accidental gaps are very common.

5. Conclusion

Zegarac (1989, 1991, 1993) has previously examined three overtones of the progressive: reproof, insincerity and temporariness. However, since he depends on the relevance theory which provides explanations in terms of optimal relevance modulated by the relationship between efforts and effects, his analysis is too abstract and lacks systematicity.

Yet, Hong (2013) has claimed that the overtone of temporariness is an implicature which is derived by the Q principle which makes the stronger
interpretation of the simple tense be negated when the weaker meaning of the progressive is used. In other words, according to Hong (2013), the overtone of temporariness is a kind of scalar implicature.

This study basically extends Hong’s analysis for the temporariness overtone to other overtones such as reproof and insincerity. In doing so, this study maintains the view that the overtones are scalar implicatures caused by the principle that controls informativeness of competitive forms in a strength scale. Yet, this study newly argued that the three overtones are closely related to one another, rather than randomly derived out of nowhere. That is, the three overtones are generated in the same manner but the systematic varieties are derived by different modal forces. When deontic modality kicks in while the semantics of the simple tense is negated, the overtone of reproof arrives at. On the other hand, when epistemic modality kicks in the negation, the overtone of insincerity is evoked.

Also, this paper examines a possibility of having an additional type of modality since some distinguishes dynamic modality from deontic and epistemic modality. Yet, it scrutinizes many aspects that show us why this view can be refuted based on Gisborne (2007). However, it should be noted that the possible presence of additional types of modality does not damage the claim of this paper since accidental gaps are prevalent.

As the last remark, I would like to note that it will be interesting to extend this study further based on An (2017).

References

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