

## **Non-prototypical uses of the generic *you* as a stance marker: A view from Kamio's *Territory of Information* (1997)\***

**Joshua Matsuoka**  
(Gwangju University)

**Matsuoka, Joshua. 2021. Non-prototypical uses of the generic *you* as a stance marker: A view from Kamio's *Territory of Information* (1997). *Linguistic Research* 38(Special Edition): 147-179.** We seek to investigate a broader range of the generic pronoun *you* beyond simple prototypical usage as well as its possible relationship with "territory." This paper focuses on unraveling key perceptions within authentic interactions and how the pronoun *you* is involved in the unfolding of stance-taking in conversation. Previous research has considered distal functions of the pronoun *you*, such as creating psychological space between oneself and information to diffuse accountability, making external generalizations, or those related to listening audiences (O'Conner 1994; Thomas-Ruzic, 1999; Kamio 2001; Stirling and Manderson 2011). However, this study departs from these previous distal deictic and broadening interpretations of the pronoun *you*. Instead, we suggest that psychological domains of a more proximal "territory of information" serve as a type of salient and well-informed piece of information when offering insight and expertise, signaling the correction of common misnomers or as a way of relating keys to greatness or success where speakers use this pronoun to take a stance or position in interaction. Kamio's (1997) framework hypothesizes that certain linguistic utterances are used for marking territory over information. We view the generic *you* switch as a type of "Realis" device. We also suggest that an inclusion of the non-prototypical *you* requires adding to Kamio's (2001) framework to depict a much closer proximal psychological subarea comprising these stances that represent strong claims over information. (Gwangju University)

**Keywords** stance, territory, proximal, generic *you*, non-prototypical

### **1. Introduction**

This paper presents a qualitative analysis of instances of authentic interaction where a speaker switches from the pronoun *we* or *I* to *you*. We argue that according to Kamio's (1997) "theory of territory of information," this shift in pronouns plays a significant role

---

\* I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and advice that contributed to the content and format of this paper. I would also like to extend my sincere gratitude to the editor(s) of *Linguistic Research*.

in the act of clarifying or elevating a speaker's underlying stance on a matter as a marker of a speaker's "territory" of a topic or information at hand. In the age of social media, authenticity and reliability of information are becoming crucial given the vast exchanges of information taking place online. This analysis revolves around how speakers leverage the generic *you* to show a high salience or appropriateness of statements, underscore a speaker's level of expertise, or information emanating from deep internal and direct experience. This paper focuses on unraveling concepts from the framework of territory within authentic interactions and how non-prototypical uses of the generic *you* are involved in the unfolding of stance-taking in conversation. This paper spotlights segments taken from long-form podcasts and other media interviews of well-known names and experts in various fields. We show how a modified model of the generic *you* can be seen as a pragmatic indicator of the proximal domain and may serve to broaden the scope of Kamio's application of territory.

The primary research questions include the following:

- 1) What kinds of stances are evident in pronoun switches?
- 2) What do pronoun switches mean in terms of territory?
- 3) What modifications can be made to Kamio's (2001) theory on generic pronouns?

In a video podcast interview, Steve Jobs discusses his insights into business management with a large audience. Interviewer Walt Mossberg's line of questioning concerns a more personalized viewpoint given Steve Jobs' unique perspectives and status in the field of technology. In line 6, Jobs switches from the pronouns *we* and *I* to the generic *you* to deliver what appears to be his exclusive perspectives on successful management to an audience. This perspective stems from his own experience and expertise, and this is indexed via the generic *you*, which involves a unique and remarkably Steve Jobsian angle.

(1) Steve Jobs and Walt Mossberg (Steve Jobs talks about managing people)

- 1 W. Mossberg: And are people willing to tell you you're wrong?
- 2 Steve Jobs: yeah

- 3 W. Mossberg: I mean other than snarky journalists, I mean people who  
work for you.
- 4 Steve Jobs: oh, ya know we have wonderful arguments.
- 5 W. Mossberg: and do you win them all or?
- 6 Steve Jobs: Oh no, I wish I did. See **you** can't. If **you** wanna hire great  
people and have them and have them stay working for **you**,  
**you** have to let them make a lot of decisions and **you** have  
to, **you** have to be run by ideas not hierarchy. The best  
ideas have to win so otherwise good people don't stay.
- 7 W. Mossberg: but **you** must be more than a facilitator who runs  
meetings. you obviously contribute your own ideas.
- 8 Steve Jobs: I contribute ideas. sure, well why would I be there if  
I didn't?

Mossberg seems to be pressing Jobs into revealing a deeper but unique insight into how the latter himself manages people by asking, "Are people willing to tell you you're wrong?" in line 1 and "Do you win them all?" in line 5. This single line (6–7) is short but is quite noteworthy, and the shift from the pronoun *I* to the generic *you* is particularly significant. Mossberg's bald line of questioning (line 5) leads to Jobs switching to the use of a non-prototypical generic *you* in his response in lines 6–7. This begs the following question: what are functional motivations for similar pronoun shifts in discursive interactions?

Previous studies on the topic of generic *you* would interpret the usage in line 6 as a means of "generalizing" or as an invitation to engage in a "simulation" of what it is perhaps like to be a great CEO like Steve Jobs (Stirling and Manderson 2011; Gast et al. 2015).<sup>1</sup> We posit an additional possibility of a more reflective perspective: a speaker can employ the generic *you* to offer a critical perspective that indicates his deeply fundamental and perhaps unique viewpoint. We suggest a territorial aspect of the generic *you*, which is not necessarily part of common knowledge or an attempt to seek empathy or common ground but rather used for the listener to process essential information that the speaker has deeply refined. Describing the generic *you* from a territorial perspective elicits such observations of speakers using *you* as a stance, which is a different interpretation from previous interpretations of this pronoun shift. Thus, we attempt to

---

1 I thank an anonymous reviewer for alerting me to this paper written by Stirling and Manderson.

address a previous gap involving properties of the generic *you* and pragmatically indicate that the information at hand falls firmly within a speaker's territory.

## 2. Review of relevant studies

### 2.1 Previous studies of the generic *you*

A theme of generality was described in the classic work of Kitagawa and Lehrer (1990). Kitagawa and Lehrer (1990) made a significant contribution to the classification of generic pronouns; they categorized the effective uses of the second-person impersonal pronoun into three major types: (1) referential, (2) impersonal, and (3) vague. Differentiating between impersonal and vague categories of *you* proved to be helpful for subsequent pronoun research (Gast et al. 2015). Further, Kitagawa and Lehrer (1990: 750) established three types of contexts in which the use of the impersonal *you* occurs: (1) "situational insertion," (2) "moral" or "truism formulation," (3) and "life drama." This made it possible to isolate meanings of inclusion and exclusion, identity functions, self-indexing, display of authority, empathy, shared perspectives, and shifts in deictic centers, and later studies reaffirmed these findings (Gast et al. 2015: 5).

Other studies expanded on the functions of generality, membership categories, and distancing. For example, O'Conner (1994) explored the pragmatic effects of pronouns by interpreting shifts from the pronoun *I* or *we* to the generic *you* in terms of switches in agency in a small data set of prisoners' narratives of the act of stabbing. It appropriately revealed the multi-layered complexities and paradoxes of the generic *you*. O'Conner posited three findings regarding why these prisoners switched to the generic *you*. These involved using a generalized *you* to emotionally affect the hearer, "positioning" the hearer as a novice, or addressing a past Self or another version of the prisoner's Self. O'Conner's proposals revealed a complex overlapping between distancing themselves and addressing themselves in the shift to the generic *you*.

Regarding psychological space, Orvell et al. (2017) interpreted pronoun shifts to denote the psychological distance from an event. People use the generic *you* to create space from a negative experience and derive meaning or emotional regulation over a negative experience from the process of reflecting on and learning from past mistakes. Stirling and Manderson (2011) included three possible perspectives for invoking general

membership categories: 1) enhancing the credibility and authenticity of the narration, 2) calling for empathy and engaging the listener, 3) as a distancing device to locate one's memory from a safe distance. For example, in their study, a patient Glenda would use her membership category as a cancer survivor, "situate" or position herself as an authority, and display credibility.

Gast et al. (2015) echoed these works (Kitagawa and Lehrer 1990; O'Conner 1994; Sterling and Manderson 2010) and formulated a systematic typology for identifying primary versus secondary functions. Gast et al. (2015) stated that generic *you* could be said to have conversational "by-effects" or "secondary effects." For example, when making "general statements" or offering "structural knowledge descriptions," a speaker presumes knowledge about a specific domain and thus claims authority as a secondary effect (Gast et al. 2015). In other words, the generic *you* was deemed to be primarily used for making abstract generalizations or to induce empathy, while the pragmatic effects of authority, distance, or objectivity were thought of as a secondary effect.

Despite insights into these categories of pronouns, relatively little attention has been paid to detailing the connection between territory and pronouns. Thomas-Ruzic's (1999) dissertation was one of the few substantial works that expanded on this perspective (Kamio 2001; Íñigo-Mora 2004). Thomas-Ruzic found uses of the generic *you* in a university classroom setting, such as making "generally correct" or timeless statements such as "*I* just want to stay here with my husband. *I* married him. It's normal to want to be with *your* husband" (1999: 320). *We* or *you* statements were considered to be "non-differentiating" when the student and instructor alike could be included in the conclusions. She described generalized statements or common ground statements such as "You win some, you lose some" where the speaker would include himself and there would be no differentiation. Thus, the territory can mark knowledge common to students and symmetrically balanced in these non-differentiating pronouns.

Thomas-Ruzic also found the use of the generic *you* for summarizing general processes and drawing generally logical conclusions. She observed that a "differentiating" generic *you* was employed when making "new learning points and correspondingly, differentiated between the instructors, who have [the] knowledge, and the students, who are acquiring it" (Thomas-Ruzic 1999: 279). Heritage's (1984, 2018) concept of "informings" denoted new information where participants would produce talk to fill an epistemic imbalance. We believe that a territory perspective provides supplemental understandings to these functions. The following two subsections present a diverse

approach based on the principles of Kamio's (1997) framework as an alternative groundwork for interactional forms of the generic *you* in the form of stance-taking.

## 2.2 Territory and the generic *you*

"Territory" is deeply inherent within our cognitive and social systems, and according to Kamio (1997), this can be seen within the structures of conversation. Kamio (1997) claimed that humans are universally territorial, as they linguistically mark barriers in communication (either physically or psychologically). The notion underlying the theory of territory of information is straightforward. If a given piece of information is close or proximal to a speaker, it is considered to fall into their territory. If the information is distal or not proximate, then it is outside of their territory. If a speech is made with a "direct-form" or in the case of a statement or assertion without any hedges, the territory is considered proximal (close) to the speaker. Conversely, if a speech contains forms of hedging, it is regarded as a "non-direct form," and territory is deemed to be distal (not close) to the speaker. Distance to information and the central postulate of the theory of territory of information was initially proposed by Kamio (1997) with the following conditions:

- (a) Information obtained through the speaker/hearer's internal direct experience.
- (b) Information embodying detailed knowledge which falls into the range of the speaker's/hearer's professional or other expertise.
- (c) Information obtained through the speaker's/hearer's external direct experience.
- (d) Information about persons, objects, events, and facts close to the speaker/hearer, including such information about the speaker/hearer him/herself.

(Kamio 1997: 39)

If one or more conditions presented in points a–d are satisfied, the information at hand is considered to be in close proximity to the speaker. This phenomenon of distance and territory was found to be contained within the substance of generic pronouns as Kamio (1997) presented. Kamio (2001) later applied this framework to the analysis of the generic *we*, *you*, and *they*. In Figure 1, "conversational space" refers to the psychological space of the speaker and hearer. "General perceived space" is defined by

a general cognitive representation of psychological space perceived by the speaker, independent of the utterance with the hearer. Thus, P1 and D1 (see Figure 1) refer to proximal and distal subareas of conversational space. P2 refers to proximal subareas of the general perceived space, and D2 refers to distal areas of the general perceived space.




Figure 1. Kamio's territory of generic pronouns  
(from Kamio 2001: 1122)

In Figure 2, *we*, *you*, and *they* can be conceptually replaced by *I*, *you*, and *he* and *she*, correspondingly. According to Kamio (2001), the pronoun *we* is located in the speaker's territory and *you* in the hearer's territory within conversational space. His main point was illustrating how the territory of the generic pronoun system structurally correlates to the demonstrative deixis system *this*, *that*, and *over there*, respectively, both in English and in Japanese.




Figure 2. Kamio's territory of generic pronouns  
(from Kamio 2001: 1121)

Additionally, Rees (1983) provided a helpful scale that depicts a corresponding pronominal distance from the Self. In this scale, *I* is closest to the Self, and *they* describes the pronoun most distant. Figures 2 and 3 are both similar to where the generic pronoun (indefinite) *you* is generally represented in a relatively distal domain away from the Self.




Figure 3. Rees' relationship between distancing strategies and pronouns  
(from Rees 1983: 16)

Kamio's theory found a specific niche in the evolution of pragmatic approaches involving one's epistemic domain and/or stance over information. It contributed to the understanding of generic pronouns (Thomas-Ruzic 1999; Íñigo-Mora 2004; Gast et al. 2015). Nevertheless, one interesting observation is that its analysis was restricted to normal prototypical use or what Kitagawa and Lehrer (1990) and Gast et al. (2015) referred to as "personal use." In contrast, the non-prototypical grammar of the generic *you* is a form not commonly found in grammar reference texts (Biber et al. 1999; Larsen-Freeman et al. 2016).

Kamio (2001) did not apply his framework to non-prototypical use but instead focused solely on parallels between the Japanese and English demonstrative systems. Thus, it appears to be potentially feasible that his examination of the generic *you* was only a partial investigation. Thomas-Ruzic (1999) attempted to turn Kamio's attention to her own findings. However, a reason for not incorporating non-prototypical data was stated in his footnote (Kamio 2001: 1111). That is, although Thomas-Ruzic's (1999) paper (which included such pragmatic meanings) was made available to him, he did not include her results in his paper because it was made available to him only after his concluding research was published in 2001, thereby allowing possible further exploration under non-prototypical use.

In the conclusion of this paper, we attempt to formulate our own modified Figures 2 and 3 of how the non-prototypical *you* operates under a territorial framework. For now, we refer to Helmbrecht's (2015) definition of three distinctive properties of non-prototypical pronouns:

- (a) the prototypical reference set is modified to some extent implying a *shift* in the pronominal category;
- (b) there is some kind of additional pragmatic meaning (or connotation) associated with such uses;




- (c) the non-prototypical use is usually strongly restricted to certain contexts (grammatical context/pragmatic and discourse context).

(Helmbrecht 2015: 178)

### 2.3 “Realis” and “Irrealis”

Another relevant segment covered by Kamio’s (1997: 138) theory is a three-stage model of information (see Figure 4), which shows that the process of shifting from “Irrealis” (state of not knowing) to “Realis” (knowing) occurs in three stages, including a second processing stage of level 2 “accumulating relevant information”. However, Kamio distinguishes between what is considered to be Realis based on differences in languages. For instance, Japanese is rather strict and does not easily allow incoming information to pass from newly learned information (NLI) to level 2. Notably, a considerable amount of stored information must persist before the incorporation of indirect to direct forms. Meanwhile, in English and Chinese, a direct form may sound perfectly natural, whereas the same statement in Japanese or Korean would be considered hearsay according to Kamio.



*A Three Stage Model of Information Incorporation*

Figure 4. Realis and Irrealis

(from Kamio 1997: 138; Akatsuka 1985)

Consequently, according to Kamio (1997), direct sentences in English may often belong in the domain of Irrealis, i.e., the state of not knowing or getting to know information. While Stage 3 Realis should be reserved only for truly incorporated information, Kamio remarked that stage 2 Realis does not even appear to exist for speakers of the English language. This certainly may seem problematic when a speaker’s directness of speech may cause them to sound as if they already have sufficient and direct

access to information. Moreover, English speakers use the direct form with much less relevant information being accumulated compared to Japanese or Korean. Given Kamio's three-stage model, we later propose a connection between the English *you*, which may pragmatically signal a more accumulated and deeply processed body of information belonging to stage 3 Realis, and a deep proximal domain of territory.

## 2.4 The concept of “stance-taking” in discourse

In this section, we introduce previous works on stance based on our notion that the generic *you* naturally asserts a stance position in cases of pragmatic pronoun switches. Although the concept of stance was not mentioned in Kamio's (1997) original framework, the notion of displaying stances in connection with claiming territory is not a concept unfamiliar to academics. Stance is a very fruitful area of research according to Englebretson (2007: 1) who claims that research has “witnessed an upsurge of interest in stance” (Rhee 2016; Lee 2019; Roh et al. 2019). In fact, in a systematic study on written academic papers, which was entitled *Voice and Stance across Disciplines in Academic Discourse*, Silver (2012) found that the very first step taken was described as “move 1,” and it involved “establishing their territory via topic generalization of increasing specificity” (206). Biber et al. (1988) found that personal pronouns and active pronoun constructions express a more personal and involved stance, while impersonal or generic pronouns and the use of passive constructions enable a speaker to project a less personal, distanced, and impersonalized stance.

Kärkkäinen (2007) stated that pronouns are included among “the linguistic resources for expressing affective and epistemic stance” (184), and the generic *you* is a resource to express an opinion or a strong claim or is used as a discourse marker about the certainty of one's information. Pronouns were also found to be crucial for conveying stances as overt or covert in situations involving face-threatening acts (Guinda and Hyland 2012). Pronouns were found to correspond to the processes of hedging or boosting, marking opinion, highlighting aspects of the identity of an author or speaker, or cueing varied levels of commitments. Additionally, stances are encoded in pronouns as cues to acknowledge listeners' presence, allocate speakership, or indicate expectations of a response by participants in turn-by-turn conversation (Hyland 1998; Kuo 1999; Keisanen 2006; Guinda and Hyland 2012).

### 3. Data

While previous studies used the specialized contexts of very personal medical narrations of illness (Stirling and Manderson 2011), monolithic university lectures (Thomas-Ruzic 1999), or narratives of prisoners' experiences (O'Conner 1994), this study was conducted in the setting of free-form discussions on aspects of various fields in the context of new media. Traditional media models often include institutional powers that govern the framing of the interaction through questioning, time constraints, and the authority to edit interviews to portray a particular perspective. The Joe Rogan Podcast (JRP) is at the forefront and perhaps one of the prime examples of a new and developing type of media format described by O'Keeffe (2006, 2011). The dissemination of critical unfiltered viewpoints is a distinguishing aspect of interaction in the age of social media. Due to the podcast's diverse fields and varying perspectives, the show may contain views counter to public opinion, which is even encouraged. Culturally speaking, the JRP is less bounded by external institutional influences. The dynamics of the JRP push the boundaries of what is accepted and welcomes perspectives that are not necessarily the norms in traditional culture. O'Keeffe (2006) noted that in a "participatory audience framework" of new media, traditional paradigms are becoming outmoded, as prior formats are being replaced as a result of the evolution of mobile technologies and their potential for shaping modern discourse.

The JRP is presented in a real-time format without a pre-planned or highly orchestrated line of questioning, which is usually employed in traditional media and editing. The participants in this study included five scientists, one writer, one actor/comedian, two CEOs, one medical doctor, and four athletes located in the United States. Podcast extracts amounting to a total of over 11 hours of audio/visual data (see Table 1) were collected and transcribed via software called otter.ai. Due to the lengthy nature of these transcripts, a sample of approximately three hours of shorter segments containing prime examples of the target generic *you* forms centering on pronoun switches were repeatedly viewed, and the sequences of stance were carefully examined. The conversation took place in a studio set-up for live recording. These podcasts extracts were selected based on a reasonably extensive viewership and the reputation of the guests in this natural and authentic conversation setting. In addition, a few other short example clips were taken from sports interviews available on YouTube for further illustration.

There is a significant difference when interviews are conducted in the public eye

versus in the context of a closed private session. The JRP viewership is significant from the standpoint that it becomes a substantial public forum for exchanging ideas. Guests in this study are aware that their interviews will easily exceed over a million views due to the podcast's sizeable reach. The guests are primarily regarded as experts in their field and are often brought onto the JRP based on their unique perspectives or very public opinions on matters. For example, for guests with specialties in the fields of medical health and research, the awareness of the potential linguistic consequences, i.e., their words can impact public perception and shape public discourse, is salient from a social construction viewpoint. The switches of the pronoun *you* were not only limited to these conversations in long-form but could be found elsewhere in discussions or interviews of varying lengths of time. Still, long-form podcasts were beneficial for our initial observations of these patterns of pronoun switches. These conversations can be considered authentic and unscripted as they last for up to three hours without any breaks. Regarding so-called long-form conversation, Brown and Gillman (1960: 2534) hinted at the usefulness of analyzing such long-form contexts by stating that present-day or contemporary findings or new usages of pronouns are drawn "from *long conversations* of native speakers," while past usages were drawn from outmoded sources such as plays, literature, and legal proceedings.

Table 1. Data Set

Name	Type	Word Count	Length
Kevin Hart JRP #1480	Long-form podcast	22549	2 hours 4 min
Michael Osterholm JRP #1439	Long-form podcast	19261	1 hour 34 min
Elon Musk JRP #1470	Long-form podcast	18600	2 hours 1 min
Andrew Weil JRP #1213	Long-form podcast	21685	1 hour 52 min
James Nester JRP #1506	Long-form podcast	2910	15 min
Kevin Hart JRP #1278	Long-form podcast	2043	12 min
Bret Weinstein JRE #1494	Long-form podcast	34000	3 hours
Andrew Huberman JRP #1513	Long-form podcast	33442	2 hours 44 min
Lance Armstrong JRP #737	Long-form podcast	1223	7 min
Matthew Walker JRP #1109	Long-form podcast	954	5 min
Peter Hotex JRP #1261	Long-form podcast	10001	1 hour
Garret Reisman JRP #1425	Long-form podcast	6421	30 min
Lebron James, Steve Jobs, Tom Brady, Shawn White	Interview Examples	1855	15 min

## 4. Analysis of pronoun switches

### 4.1 The use of the generic *you* to denote greatness and the secrets of success

In our interpretation, Kevin Hart's use of this pronoun switch appears to intently resemble the effects of 'Illeism,' which is the technique of referring to oneself in the third person, self-promotion, or denoting enlightenment about a topic. This would represent a way of highlighting the direct first-hand experience of attaining success or greatness. For example, in Michael Jordan's NBA Hall of Fame speech, there is only a single *you*-framed episode of stance where Jordan sums up the theme that threads through his entire speech: "As a basketball player, I'm trying to become the best that I can, you know, and for someone like me who achieved a lot, in over the time of my career, *you* look for any kind of messages that people may say or do to get *you* motivated to play the game of basketball at the highest level because that's when I feel like I excel at my best" (Jordan 2009). The generic *you* appears to pragmatically highlight his success as well as the keys to what made him great. In extracts 2 and 3, Kevin Hart, a famous comedian and actor, opens up about his experiences.

(2) Kevin Hart JRP #1278 (16:30)

- 1 Joe Rogan: Is that something you always had? The go-get?
- 2 Kevin Hart: Always had that. I always had that. I told you before, that's my mom. RIP Nancy Hart. Don't tell me I can't do something because now I'm pissed. Now I'm going to do it. Don't tell me that. And that's a gift and a curse. That's a gift and a curse. I don't know if you saw, but in my documentary, I put it all out there. That's a curse. "Kev, don't put that video up. Don't do that. Don't tell me what the fuck not to do. I'm going to do it." And sometimes it don't do what **you** think it was going to do. **You** don't know everything; **you** don't know everything. And **you're** not that great to think that **you** do know everything. And you can get bit in the ass by thinking that. But **you** got to get bit to go, "Ooh, let me get better at that."

(3) Kevin Hart JRP #1278 (8:22)

- 1 Kevin Hart: So, everything that I've done, everything that I'm trying to do, when I do talk about it, I come proven. I'm only talking about this because I really got knowledge about it. I don't got knowledge about it because I'm the smartest motherfucker in the world. That's not what the knowledge is coming from, Joe.
- 2 Kevin Hart: My knowledge is coming from, "Hey, man, yo don't walk through door number one. I walked through that door..."
- 3 Kevin Hart: Yeah. "There's a bunch of shit in that door." It wasn't till I came out that door that I saw those monsters that I knew the other monsters weren't as bad in door number two. But door number three is finally where **you** should go. I messed up, man. I went to the first two doors wrong. Why can't I give that to somebody that hasn't experienced those doors yet? Why can't I just give that information and possibly prevent them from walking into those doors?
- 4 Kevin Hart: As adults, we have a job to do, whether **you** want to admit it or not, **your** job is to set up the next generation. That's our job. Whether **you** want to fucking admit it or not. It's **your** kids. It's **your** friends. It's whomever. **You're** supposed to live a certain way, do certain things, to set up for the next generation to come and to be able to do better. If **you** don't, then **you're** not doing your part.

Although this is an interactive talk, Hart uses the pronoun *you* as a way to drive his mini monologue in each of these segments in his assertions about life. Kevin Hart brings forth, in his own words, wisdom about life in the face of difficulties. If we consider the central postulates of the theory of territory, proximal territory denotes facts close to the speaker or information embodied within one's range of professional or other expertise. For example, it might be expected that someone reflecting on their self-experiences would use the first-person pronoun *I*. However, speakers often use *you* when referring to oneself as in line 2 of extract 2 and lines 3 and 4 of extract 3. Here, Hart uses the present tense, e.g., "door number three is finally where you should go."

We observed that the use of pronouns to denote greatness occurs in the context of

elite athletics as illustrated in the next example. This example of pronoun switching is a familiar occurrence in the world of sports figures. Extract 4 was taken from a short clip where the great basketball player LeBron James is asked about his perspectives after an NBA basketball game.

(4) LeBron James

- 1 Reporter: There were several moments where there was superstar versus superstar, where **you** versus Giannis or Anthony versus Giannis, I know you live for those moments, but Just what goes through **your** mind when **you're** in those times?
- 2 LeBron James: Umm, you know for **me**, it's never about individual challenge, or individual game, it's about the team. Now **you** do take the challenge, against anybody, the game too, not make it personal, so making sure, **your** mind is in the right frame, and just try to make plays for teammates to be successful.

Rather than using the first-person pronoun *I*, LeBron James employs the generic pronoun *you*. The use of generic pronouns may also function to project status of differentiation or establish persona and presence of coming from someone who has found the “secrets of success.” Again, this switching between *I* and *you* references oneself at the highest levels, a speech found in world-renowned athletes.

(5) Tom Brady talks about playing football

- Tom Brady: You know **you** want to assert your will on the other team. That's what it's about. And on that particular night, they were just in our way. They were mosquitos; we were the windshield. It was one throw that I" remember for my entire life...I pulled the ball out, and I looked, and I saw the back of his numbers..., and it was probably of the best throws I've ever made in my career with the anticipation and accuracy and the way it turned out. It was just, you know, **you** feel like, at that point, **you** can't do much wrong. The best part of football for me in

so many ways is it's the ultimate living in the moment, you know, it's a time capsule, it's a little chess match, volleying the ball back to each other, their offense, our offense You know it's not going to go on forever, and I think in so many ways **you're** enjoying that moment, that ebb and flow that we had that night.

(6) Shawn White talks about pressure situations

Shawn White: I've always described those pressure situations as, like, being completely focused on what **you're** about to do, and then having a slight of, **you** know, I don't care what happens, because you need that sort of thing to take the pressure off, put it into perspective. Why not just go for it. Be the guy **you** know **you** are. You can do it. I'm standing there waiting for my score, and it hits. It was a perfect score.

In the excerpts presented above, the generic *you* is inserted along with the present tense, which indeed communicates vividness. More notably, though, the generic *you* provides a notion of closeness to information from a professional, experiential, grandness of accomplishment perspective. In addition, the speakers appear credible and knowledgeable about this topic, denoting a high level of mastery.

An interesting asymmetrical territorial dynamic appears to influence the switches of the pronoun *you*. Rogan is an expert and popular figure in his own right in sports, comedy, and entertainment. However, his field of expertise is often different from that of his guests. Therefore, Rogan's questions are often framed from an asymmetrical territorial distance based on his lack of information about a given topic. Rogan often primes the speaker to articulate deeply held viewpoints or contribute authentic stances through territorial asymmetry, and he positions himself distally from the information as a hearer. According to Kamio's (1997) central postulates, when conditions a–d are absent from the hearer's scale, this creates asymmetry.

In addition, Kevin Hart is also speaking to a broad audience of hearers where the same asymmetric dynamics are present in a participation framework. Therefore, it appears that the epistemic imbalance between Kevin Hart and the larger audience satisfies the



territorial conditions as an adequate basis for establishing his territory; thus, it may explain the primary reasons to assert the generic pronoun *you*.

(7) Kevin Hart JRP #1278 (11:02)

- 1 Joe Rogan: Did you have a time in your life where you realized that you were doing the right thing? A time in your life where you realized, in your comedy career, in particular, where you realized like, "Oh, I'm getting some fucking traction. This is really rolling." In the beginning, you, probably like all of us, were not sure what was going to happen. You're trying; you're doing open mics. You're trying to make it. Was there a time where you were like, This approach. This is happening. I've got.
- 2 Kevin Hart: "All right, whatever." I wasn't even taking it serious. This was not something I was taking serious. And this is an example of sometimes **you** don't know what it's going to be. **You** don't know what the fuel in a rocket is going to be. **You** just got to fucking buckle up and be prepared for the takeoff. Now, if it takes off and **you** don't know where the seatbelts are and **you** don't know where the lights and shit at, well, now **you** got a fucked-up rocket ride. **You're** going to crash. It's over. It's over if **you're** not ready.
- 3 Joe Rogan: Yeah.

In line 2 of extract 7, he is detailing his rise to fame by saying, "I wasn't even taking it serious. This was not something I was taking serious. And this is an example of sometimes *you* don't know what it's going to be. *You* don't know what the fuel in a rocket is going to be." In extract 7, the generic *you* suggests asymmetry, implying some level of expertise, prestigious social status, or capacity to advise on life. Our interpretations differ from that of Stirling and Manderson (2011) who concluded that the patient designed her speech to align with audiences or that of Gast et al. (2015) who described the motivations as abstraction/generalization and joint empathy. In our examples, some of the most high-profile names in tech, entertainment, sports, etc., appeared on the JRP. This presented a distinctive dynamic from the more confidential

contexts used to elicit narratives of illness or imprisonment presented in the literature review section. Here, the primary motivations for the generic *you* more closely reflect the contribution of in-depth meanings on accumulated information where the dynamics remain territorially asymmetrical.

O’Conner’s (1994) concept of generic *you* as positioning, which she acknowledged to be an act of a stance in the setting of a participation framework, is certainly useful. In the context of prison as well as that of ours, a speaker may position himself for a positive construction of a future self. However, we do not think that O’Conner’s (1994) interpretation of a self-indexing *you* as a distanced self, evoking affective involvement in the hearer, fully applies in our data. Similarly, Gast et al.’s (2015) interpretations regarding deriving meaning from a past difficult situation or gaining empathy from a hearer were not considered in our data as primary motivations for the generic *you*.

## 4.2 A stance of insight

What this paper describes as a generic *you*-framed “stance of insight” may appear, on the surface, to bear similarities with Heritage’s (1984, 2018) concept of “informings.” In contrast, Heritage (2018) used “informings” to denote new information within common everyday interactions. Here, however, a stance of insight is more exclusive and requires a certain level of territorial maneuvering as a display of a knowledge resource. A stance of insight is beyond what is mentioned in everyday conversation. That is, the generic *you* attaches territorial notions involving deeper levels of perspectives or paradigms. For instance, Heritage’s “informings” included common everyday talk, e.g., “Jo saw the movie, and it terribly depressed her.” However, stances of insights indicate information consisting of an epistemic asymmetric imbalance that would prompt most listeners to react with astonishment to such gravity of information. For example, Joe Rogan often responded to *you*-framed stances of insight with exclamatory responses such as “Wow!” or “What?” or “Really?”

This stance of insight framed with the generic *you* for new or outside information can be illustrated by the following extracts where Garrett Reisman, a former NASA astronaut, talks about his experiences of living in space. It functions as an overt cue for new information or perspectives that the hearer is unfamiliar with or may not have heard about. Again, this asymmetry is significant in the context of a participatory audience

framework.

(8) Garrett Reisman JRP #1425 (4:34)

- 1 Rogan: What is it like to sweat in space?
- 2 Reisman: It's weird. Because, what happens is, if **you** don't notice, like in the beginning **you** don't even realize it but it's all building up, and even without like if **you** have no hair to soak it up it just builds up like this thin film of water on your head like a coating of water. And **you** don't even notice it because it doesn't run down, and then somebody calls **your** name, and **you're** like yeah, and it's like
- 3 Rogan: Oh, that's crazy I've never even thought of that so it just kind of floats off **your** body

The information that Reisman discusses above is related to a rare human experience. As seen here, it would not be appropriate to use the generic *you* when the speaker lacks detailed knowledge of the subject unless it is used as an interrogative or confirmatory expression as in line 3 of extract 8. Garrett Reisman spent nearly 100 days on the space station. Reisman's expertise and this dynamic of information asymmetry between the speaker and the audience are alluded to in his switch of generic pronouns from *I* to *you*. It is noticeable that the generic *you*-framed utterances in these examples would only be considered appropriate if the territory of information falls deeply within the speaker's domain but outside of the hearer's territory.

(9) Garrett Reisman JRP #1425 (10:18)

- 1 Rogan: So, all the blood was just kind of like pooling in your head? If you're like hanging by gravity boots or something?
- 2 Reisman: It feels exactly like that
- 3 Rogan: Wow.
- 4 Reisman: And then after day two, **you** get used to it and it doesn't bother **you** anymore. But **you** feel congested, because **you** still have all this volume up here. So, **your** sense of smell and **your** sense of taste, are all deadened

- 5 Rogan: Wow.
- 6 Reisman: It's kind of like, yeah, so it's kind of like when **you** have a cold and your sense of smell and **your** sense of taste or like not as strong. So, it's like that all the time. That's why we take, we cover, we have every hot sauce known to humankind up on the space station like Siracha, we got, **you** know, Louisiana Cajun fire sauce and all, whatever. We got a whole stockpile of it because **you** pour that on everything so **you** can get some taste, because otherwise everything tastes really bland.
- 7 Rogan: Oh wow.

These first-hand glimpses of what it is like to work in outer space (line 6 of extract 9) are outside of the domain of the territory of most humans. Therefore, his *you*-framed stance of insight denotes an exceptional perspective or experience. Although the pronoun *we* or *I* would usually refer to a group of astronauts, the generic *you*, in this case, conveys a pragmatic meaning of accumulated and rare insights. Further, while talking about life in space, the generic pronoun *you* characterizes that the speaker has adequate evidence for his assertions, and more precisely, it indicates that the information belongs only to Reisman's territory and not a shared experience within the hearer's territory. The lack of knowledge is made evident by Rogan's reactions of "Oh wow" to the description of daily activities in zero gravity space.

Another example of a stance of insight can be found in Rogan's conversation with Dr. Andrew Weil, a well-known physician who has a unique and alternative approach to medicine. In extract 10, even while talking about anecdotal and unscientific experiences, Weil uses the generic *you* to describe his first-hand experiences in order to support his notions about the body's healing mechanisms. In this extract, Weil introduces the topic of medical hexing, an area of medical research that most people are not familiar with. Notably, his generic *you*-framed stance of insight adds a more detailed perspective that the audience or hearer is not yet aware of.

(10) Andrew Weil JRP #1213 (18:06)

- 1 Rogan: So, when **you're** saying someone's a goner **you** trigger stress, or **you** trigger helplessness like what

- 2 Weil: Well to have a medically trained person tell **you** that  
**you're** not gonna live that's it that's a curse
- 3 Rogan: yeah.
- 4 Weil: It's a medical hex.
- 5 Rogan: How strange is it that sometimes **your** life is hanging on  
the border of you believing **you're** gonna be okay and **you**  
believe in **you're** not gonna be oh.
- 6 Weil: So, **you** want to be very careful about **you** know whose hands  
**you** place yourself in.
- 7 Rogan: Yes.
- 8 Weil: **You** never want to stay in treatment with a doctor who  
thinks **you** can't get better.

In line 8, Weil puts the hearer into the shoes of the victim of an automobile accident and shares a medical practitioner's perspective. The claim, in this instance, is that the unconscious mind is more influential for our well-being than it is currently considered to be and that this is not something that is taught in medical schools. A stance frame of insight of this medical topic is attempted in line 6 by using the generic *you* and then in line 8 by paraphrasing his statement in a slightly different way. Interestingly, within this overall exchange, Andrew Weil limits his use of the generic *you* to only the most insightful information as a specialist in his field. This *you*-framed segment of speech evokes the stance of taking a position or making a strong claim about an utterance (Kärkkäinen 2007). The aforementioned conversation regarding Andrew Weil's training continues (the full conversation was not included due to limited space) as he reveals his expertise and shares his unique position that bridges the gap between alternative and allopathic medicine. This type of new information or insight is consistent with speaker and hearers' territorial asymmetry. Weil's implied evaluation of what we term a stance of insight is naturally framed with the generic *you*.

#### 4.3 A stance to correct common misnomers

Let us first present a slight distinction between Thomas-Ruzic's (1999) and Sacks' (1992) notion of "making generally correct statements" using our notion of a "stance for correcting common misnomers." When measured against the framework of Kamio's

(1997) territory domains, the practice of making a generally correct statement does not necessarily indicate epistemic asymmetry when a speaker is close to the information while the hearer is distal. On the contrary, a goal of making generally correct statements is to propose that what is said is generally true or typical for others and, thus, is easily accessed information or already understood to be close to the hearer's territory. Therefore, the practice of making generally correct statements underscores already processed but, perhaps, superficial knowledge that we deem symmetrically close to both the speaker and hearer. For example, the phrase "you win some, you lose some" is a typically acknowledged truth. However, when speakers take stances to correct common misnomers, a speaker assumes that the information is not generally common knowledge for the hearer. This is evident in extracts 11 and 12 where the speaker corrects a common misunderstanding about the cause of good sleep.

(11) Matthew Walker JRP #1109 (52:30)

- 1 Walker: So cold is better. The paradox here though is that **you** need to warm your feet and your hands to kind of charm the blood away from **your** core out to the surface and radiate that heat
- 2 Rogan: So, **you** should go to sleep with socks and gloves on?
- 3 Walker: Yeah, or better still have a hot bath. Evidence here too, that I discussed where people say, **you** know, I get out of a hot bath and I feel nice and toasty and relaxed and that's why I fall asleep, it's the opposite. When **you** get into a bath. You get vasodilation or you **you** sort of get rosy cheeks red skin, all of the blood rushes to the surface **you** get out of the bath, and **you** have this massive thermal dump of heat that just evacuates from the body, **your** core body temperature plummets. And that's why **you** sleep better so **you** can hack the system very easily.
- 4 Rogan: Wow. So, **your** core body temperature plummets and that's what makes **you** sleep easier. Yeah, that sounds so counterintuitive, but it makes sense.
- 5 Walker: And it makes sense, because that's how we were designed.

(12) Matthew Walker JRP #1109 (88:25)

- 1 Walker: Think about **your** cardiovascular system though, and all it takes is one hour, because there is a global experiment that's performed on 1.6 billion people across 70 countries twice a year, and it's called daylight savings time. Now, in the spring when we lose an hour of sleep, we see a subsequent 24% increase in heart attacks,
- 2 Rogan: What?
- 3 Walker: In the fall. In the autumn, when we gain in our sleep as a 21% decrease in heart attacks, so it's bidirectional.
- 4 Rogan: Wow!
- 5 Walker: That's how fragile and vulnerable. **Your** body is to even just the smallest perturbation of sleep. One hour.
- 6 Rogan: One hour? That's insane. Wow. That is.. you're blowing my fucking mind.

Thus, the information presented above exists at a distal domain for the hearer Joe Rogan in terms of unprocessed information, and it is in the realm of Irrealis for him. Moreover, as in the previous sections 4.1 and 4.2, a statement that corrects a common misnomer only occurs at a speaker's close proximal territory with the sufficiency of the statement to elucidate the accuracy of the information and knowledgeable expertise. Again, the domain of territory of Sacks' (1992) generally correct statements may include information in the domain of the distal territory of the speaker and hearer as in the case of hearsay or common assumptions.

We believe that the act of correcting common misnomers includes clear territorial notions when the information is held deep in the speaker's territory and the information has concurrently not been adequately integrated by the hearers. In the following extracts 13 and 14, Joe Rogan interviews Andrew Huberman. Huberman is a tenured professor at the Department of Neurobiology, Stanford University School of Medicine. He specializes in brain development, brain plasticity, and neural regeneration and repair. Again, we see that the generic pronoun is used to pragmatically indicate that the information at hand falls into the speaker's territory but does not fall within the hearer's territory. For example, the generic *you* is used in response to the common misnomer or widespread misunderstanding that stress *kills* the immune system. Huberman emphasizes that this is a common misnomer because he feels that it is paradoxically the opposite:

stress *activates* the immune system. The choice of pronouns used in the following extract 13 is notable.

(13) Andrew Huberman JRP #1513 (1:18:23)

- 1 Huberman: I think **you** know James talked about this in his book, but those breathwork of the sort where **you** know kind of tumor type breathing of doing **you** know 30 inhales and really offloading carbon dioxide that causes the release of noradrenaline norepinephrine, and noradrenaline norepinephrine are mother nature's way of buffering us against infection and disease everyone thinks stress kills **your** immune system. It's the opposite stress activates **your** immune system, and that makes sense. If we suddenly had to forage or go out and find water we need two or three days and we didn't know what we're gonna **you** can't afford to get sick this is why if **you** work work work work work and then you finally rest **you're** more likely to get sick as you go into that more parasympathetic relaxed state because **your** immune system also gets shut off.
- 2 Rogan: Is that why people in prison are getting covid19 or not really getting sick there's so many of them that are asymptomatic?

Rather than saying "*our*" or "*my* immune" system, Huberman uses the generic pronoun *your* and says "*your* immune system" as a mark of what we propose to make his stance clear. This, however, is different from Kitagawa and Lehrer's (1990) impersonal use or Laberge and Sankoff's (1979: 429) "reflecting on conventional wisdom" or "truisms or morals," as this usage implies just the opposite. Here, the generic *you* indicates a more unconventional perspective, one that is *not* understood as a general truth and takes some time and mental processing for the listener to grasp. Furthermore, these stances involve territorial factors because they are often counterintuitive to society's norms. In a sense, they are not based simply on generalizations but go against the grain to take a stance *against* commonly held beliefs. Further, there is a territorial distinction



between generalizations based on another's experience and generalizations derived from direct participation. This may contribute to why the switch to the pronoun *you* is naturally accepted here, which is because it satisfies the condition of being close to the speaker's territory and field of expertise.

Extract 14 shows how the generic *you* can be used to specifically highlight and correct a common misnomer about hypnosis and legitimate science.

(14) Andrew Huberman JRP #1513 (61:04)

- 1    Huberman:    **We** haven't looked at visualization specifically. The one thing that is very close to visualization which is very powerful based on neuroimaging studies, so legitimate science, I should say, is hypnosis. Hypnosis is a really unique state and this is of Mind and Body.
- 2    Rogan:        Have you been hypnotized?
- 3    Huberman:    Many times. Yeah. And I'm very interested in hypnosis because of the work with Spiegel and the incredible success he's had with pain management, smoking cessations, these kinds of things.
- 4    Huberman:    Hypnosis is a state of deep relaxation not unlike sleep, but also deep focus. So, it's very unlike any other state of mind, **you're** either usually asleep or **you're** focused, or somewhere in between, kind of drifting back and forth in between. But hypnosis is a deliberate narrowing of context, so the person or the audio script is bringing you into a state of mind that's centered around particular types of events, but **you're** in deep rest and the idea is that **you're** taking that plasticity process of focus and urgency and then rest and **you're** combining them into a single session, and so hypnosis and deep hypnotic states are the place where neural plasticity can be accelerated

If we consider Rogan's question in line 2, we see that his question provides Huberman with the opportunity to clarify his territorial credibility. Rogan may ask guests follow-up questions, looking for more necessary details or prodding them to explain the

reasons for their opinions in a better way. This often results in one having to provide additional examples and more concise clarifications or constructing a more refined and articulated position on matters; this is where the generic *you* contributes as an index of territory. Rogan interjects in line 2 to ask, “Have you ever been hypnotized?” This is a crucial interjection, as this question seems to be targeted at assessing Huberman’s first-hand experience with hypnosis before any academic claims are made on the subject; it addresses Kamio’s (1997) territorial conditions (a, c) obtained through internal/external direct experiences. Huberman’s reply in line 4, in essence, conveys that his territory also stems from personal internal direct (pain, emotions, beliefs) and external direct (obtained through five senses) experience.

In extract 14, the topic of conversation transitions from visualization/mental training to the subject of hypnosis. Huberman uses the generic *you* to situate himself as an expert through this topic in this brief background of hypnosis although his expertise is in neurobiology. Again, in this case, the significance of the use of the pronoun *you* in place of *people*, *humans*, or *we* is that a generic *you*-framed segment demonstrates the marking of information belonging to the proximal domain of territory. We agree with Stirling and Manderson (2011; 1600) that the generic *you* “is a sophisticated interactive device with the potential to allow the speaker to display his/her credentials.” However, we posit that in correcting common misnomers, the generic *you* plays a role not necessarily to align with and engage the addressee but for communication of territory in the form of an insider’s relationship to the information.

## 5. Discussion

### 5.1 Generic *you* and proximity to information

Perhaps, the most noticeable observation about the generic *you* pronoun in our data is within the context of speakers offering up stances. When viewed through the lens of the framework of territory, our observations appeared to emphasize a more stance-oriented usage. While we did not have any significant disagreement with the findings substantiated in previous literature (Kitagawa and Lehrer 1990; Heritage 2018), our analysis concurred most closely with Stirling and Manderson’s (2011) effects of authority and experience of the speaker and O’Conner’s (1994) positioning. A particular

distinction could be made in that previous generalizing functions, truisms, or the practice of evoking epistemic symmetry were not found to be as salient in our data. Overall, our proposals articulated departures from the psychologically distal or generalizing interpretations as primary effects as discussed in the literature review (Gast et al. 2015).

In the next section, we offer our own interpretations in the form of a slightly modified application of Kamio's (2001) framework for the use of generic pronouns to more closely illustrate what we believe occurs in cases of non-prototypical pronoun shifts and territory. Our modifications follow a similar adjustment made by Íñigo-Mora (2004) by expanding Kamio's (2001) framework to include additional domains. The psychological domain of a territory of information more proximal to our knowledge has not been discussed in prior studies. Nevertheless, the use of the generic *you* for stance-taking was a noticeable pattern, which we felt justified our rationale for subsequently expanding on Kamio's (2001) frame.

## 5.2 Modifications to Kamio's territory framework

Our analysis section rationalizes two possible areas for the adaptations of Kamio's pronoun framework (see Figures 2 and 3). First, Kamio's (2001) application places the generic *you* in Figure 2's distal domain of conversational space as seen below (for convenience). This corresponds to prototypical uses of *you*. However, we found it possible to incorporate the non-prototypical usage of *you* as a referent corresponding to *I* or *we*. This even underscores key concepts found in the previous literature on insider knowledge, status, authority, agency, etc., which can be pragmatically indexed in an *I*-to-*you* pronoun shift. A given piece of information in the speaker's vicinity lies at the crux of Kamio's theory. It seems reasonable to capture these properties of pronoun shifts in a slightly modified framework.




Figure 2. Kamio's (original) territory of generic pronouns (repeated)  
(from Kamio 2001: 1122)

As mentioned earlier, Íñigo-Mora (2004) suggested a modified framework by expanding Kamio's (2001) framework to include an additional domain of D3 (domain beyond D2 in Figure 2) that added a more distant area (*they*) representative of O'Keeffe's (2006, 2011) participatory audiences framework (included in the distal domain). Our analysis suggests that the use of the generic *you* creates an additional proximal domain of a speaker's territory. In Figure 5, the modified area P1 is where the generic *you* is located. Kamio's 2001 study did not acknowledge this P1 area where the generic *you* is now placed.




Figure 5. Our modified Figure 2 framework for the territory of the generic *you*

Figure 6 presents our modification of Figure 3. Distance 0 is a new location where we place the generic *you*. We describe this location as most proximal to the Self level.




Figure 6. Our modification of Figure 3: Distancing scale of the non-prototypical generic *you*

Although Kamio (2001) did not account for the use of *you* in the proximal territory of information, ironically, what we propose here is not far from his underlying conception during the early stages of the evolution of his (1997) framework; he wrote the following:

Although there could be a large number of psychological scales that may underlie aspects of the structure and functioning of human language, those that can be brought to bear upon the notion of territory must have SELF at one end

of them. That is, the notion of territory must necessarily involve the SELF at one end of them... Territory can be characterized as an extension of SELF. If this interpretation is plausible, then it may not be an exaggeration to say, in concluding this book, that the work reported here, which has been concerned with the notion of territory, has been a linguistic study of SELF” (Kamio 1997: 196).

This makes logical sense, as in the case of animals as well as humans, it is natural to think of territory in terms of survival and protection. Concerning face-to-face interaction, the following question can be explored: what drives the need to construct a grammar around these stances as a means to place territory over information using the generic *you*? Kamio remarked that it is certainly the Ego. He said, “What lies at the center of territories is clearly Ego... and animals, as well as humans, construct a territory as a means of protecting what lies at the heart of them, that is, their Ego” (Kamio 1994, 447). It appears that an overlooked function of the generic *you* is paradoxically deployed to gauge much closer proximity to the speaker’s domain of territory of information than previously accounted for. Their territory of information is essentially involved in and can be characterized as a linguistic extension of their psychological scales, i.e., their Self (Kamio 1997). This paper psychologically positions the generic *you* directly adjacent to the Self and or Ego.

Another academic contribution we would like to offer is viewing the generic *you* switch as a Realis device. Kamio proposed that utterances in Chinese and English “may [often] sound as if the speaker is very close to the information they express or as if he/she somehow has direct access to the information” (Kamio 1997: 55). Though this may be true, these pronoun shifts may present a specific case of a linguistic device being deployed to indicate direct information at stage 3 of Realis (see Figure 4). On a broad social construction level, this aids in the understanding of how speakers orient their utterances based on what one has processed as accumulated knowledge.

## 6. Conclusion

A shortcoming of our study may be the lack of exploration of lexico-grammatical features or unique vocabulary. A co-occurring linguistic methodology was previously

covered by Thomas-Ruzic's (1999) coaching function. However, we decided that our method could adequately describe the functional patterns of this phenomenon by following a similar approach as that of other studies that relied solely on microcosmic contextual case study analyses (Kitagawa and Lehrer 1990; O'Connor 1994; Kamio 2001; Yates and Hiles 2010; Stirling and Manderson 2011). Overall, we suggest that the principles of the territory of information (Kamio 1997) may offer some beneficial insights into referencing the concept of territory based on the relationship to see where access to information falls. Although we do not necessarily disagree with other possible perspectives of the studies discussed in the literature review section, we found that in this particular context, the vantage point of territory created a new lens for conveying stances, which was valuable. We did not intend to target Kamio's (2001) work on generic pronouns or appear critical but felt it necessary to account for these patterns. We intended to build on Kamio's underlying concepts and framework more broadly by incorporating non-prototypical phenomena. We believe that the strength of this territory-based approach allows for broader understandings of the generic *you* and hope to have represented a different vantage point of conveying stances.

At the heart of Kamio's original framework (1997) is a prevalent need for humans to express their territorial nature, and we sought to expand it beyond Kamio's linguistic manifestations of direct/indirect forms. In this study, the generic *you* was evaluated as a stance device through interaction sequences to say something of relevance, and insight was used when presenting newsworthy information or correcting common misnomers. As discussed in this paper, the usage of non-prototypical pronouns assures that a speaker's vital insights and accumulated body of knowledge represent Realis. We interpreted a type of paradoxical double reference to promote one's Ego through a process similar to illeism when referring to one's success as in the case of sports talk. However, from a speaker's viewpoint, the benefits of employing the generic *you* likely impact public perception in a positive way. Our interpretation implies expertise, prestigious social status, or adding to one's perceived legacy or lasting impact in society. In the JRP, new knowledge and evolving paradigms seem to find their way into broader audiences and repeat themselves in other social forums, and pronoun shifts may denote important embodiment of stances on issues. There is room to explore further implications of understanding the non-prototypical generic *you* in different contexts, such as public motivational speaking and commencement talks. Future studies on the use of non-prototypical pronouns may build upon O'Connor's (1994) suggested implications of the use of pronouns for

reshaping discursive selves or constructing a territory of protection from face-threatening acts, which are relevant in the age of social media.

## References

- Akatsuka, Noriko. 1985. Conditionals and the epistemic scale. *Language* 61(3): 625-639.
- Biber, Douglas and Edward Finegan. 1988. Adverbial stance types in English. *Discourse Processes* 11(1): 1-34.
- Biber, Douglas, Stig Johansson, Geoffrey Leech, Susan Conrad, Edward Finegan, and Randolph Quirk. 1999. *Longman grammar of spoken and written English*. Harlow, England: Longman.
- Brown, Roger and Albert Gilman. 1960. The pronouns of power and solidarity. In Thomas A. Sebeok (ed.), *Style in Language*, 253-276. Boston: MIT Press.
- Englebretson, Robert. 2007. Stancetaking in discourse: an introduction. In Robert Englebretson (ed.), *Stancetaking in discourse: Subjectivity, evaluation, interaction*, 1-25. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing.
- Gast, Volker, Lisa Deringer, Florian Haas, and Olga Rudolf. 2015. Impersonal uses of the second person singular: A pragmatic analysis of generalization and empathy effects. *Journal of Pragmatics* 88: 148-162.
- Guinda, Carmen Sancho and Ken Hyland. 2012. Introduction: a context-sensitive approach to stance and voice. In Ken Hyland and Carmen Sancho Guinda (eds.), *Stance and voice in written academic genres*, 1-14. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Helmbrecht, Johannes. 2015. A typology of non-prototypical uses of personal pronouns: Synchrony and diachrony. *Journal of Pragmatics* 88: 176-189.
- Heritage, John. 1984. A change-of-state token and aspects of its sequential placement. In John Maxwell Atkinson and John Heritage (eds.), *Structures of social action: Studies in conversation analysis*, 299-345. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Heritage, John. 2018. Turn-initial particles in English. In John Heritage and Marja-Leena Sorjonen (eds.), *Between turn and sequence: Turn-initial particles across languages*, 155-189. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Íñigo-Mora, Isabel. 2004. On the use of the personal pronoun *we* in communities. *Journal of Language and Politics* 3(1): 27-52.
- Jordan, Michael. 2009. NBA Hall of fame speech. Genius.com. <https://genius.com/Michael-jordan-nba-hall-of-fame-enshrinement-speech-annotated>.
- Kamio, Akio. 1997. *Territory of information*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing.
- Kamio, Akio. 2001. English generic *we*, *you*, and *they*: An analysis in terms of territory of information. *Journal of Pragmatics* 33(7): 1111-1124.
- Kärkkäinen, Elise. 2007. The role of *I guess* in conversational stancetaking. In Robert Englebretson

- (ed.), *Stancetaking in discourse: Subjectivity, evaluation, interaction*, 183-219. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing
- Kitagawa, Chisato and Adrienne Lehrer. 1990. Impersonal uses of pronouns. *Journal of Pragmatics* 14(5): 739-759.
- Kuo, Chih-Hua. 1999. The use of personal pronouns: Role relationships in scientific journal articles. *English for Specific Purposes* 18(2): 121-138.
- Laberge, Suzanne and Gillian Sankoff. 1979. Anything you can do. In Talmy Givón (ed.), *Discourse and syntax*, 417-440. New York: Academic Press.
- Larsen-Freeman, Dianne, Marianne Celce-Murcia, Jan Frodesen, Benjamin White, and Howard Alan Williams. 2016. *The grammar book: Form, meaning, and use for English language teachers*. Boston: National Geographic Learning, Heinle Cengage Learning.
- Lee, Hye-Kyung. 2019. Lexical bundles in linguistics textbooks. *Linguistic Research* 37(1): 121-145.
- O'Conner, Patricia E. 1994. "You could feel it through the skin": Agency and positioning in prisoners' stabbing stories. *Text-Interdisciplinary Journal for the Study of Discourse* 14(1): 45-76.
- O'Keeffe, Anne. 2006. *Investigating media discourse*. London: Routledge.
- O'Keeffe, Anne. 2011. Media and discourse analysis. In James Paul Gee and Michael Handford (eds.), *The Routledge handbook of discourse analysis*, 441-454. London: Routledge.
- Orvell, Ariana, Ethan Kross, and Susan A. Gelman. 2017. How "you" makes meaning. *Science* 355(6331): 1299-1302.
- Rees, Anne. 1983. *Pronouns of person and power: A study of personal pronouns in public discourse*. PhD Dissertation. The University of Sheffield.
- Rhee, Seongha. 2016. On the emergence of the stance-marking function of English adverbs: A case of intensifiers. *Linguistic Research* 33(3): 395-436.
- Roh, Jung Hwi, Wooyong Jin, Eunsong Kim, Hayoung Kim, and Iksoo Kwon. 2019. Multimodality and discourse viewpoint configuration: a case study of UK political posters. *Linguistic Research* 36(2): 289-323.
- Sacks, Harvey. 1992. *Lectures on conversation*. Maiden, MA: Blackwell.
- Silver, Marc. 2012. Voice and stance across disciplines in academic discourse. In Ken Hyland and Carmen Shancio Guinda (eds.), *Stance and voice in written academic genres*, 202-217. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Stirling, Lesley and Lenore Manderson. 2011. About you: Empathy, objectivity and authority. *Journal of Pragmatics* 43(6): 1581-1602.
- Thomas-Ruzic, Maria Lydia. 1999. *Language and activity: We, you and I in instructional talk*. PhD Dissertation. The University of Colorado.
- Yates, Scott and David Hiles. 2010. "You can't" but "I do": Rules, ethics and the significance of shifts in pronominal forms for self-positioning in talk. *Discourse Studies* 12(4): 535-551.



**Joshua Matsuoka**

Assistant Professor

College of Humanities and Social Science

Faculty of Foreign Languages

Gwangju University

277 Hyodeok-ro, Nam-gu

Gwangju, South Korea 61743

E-mail: [joshuamatsuoka@gmail.com](mailto:joshuamatsuoka@gmail.com)

Received: 2021. 03. 18.

Revised: 2021. 08. 16.

Accepted: 2021. 09. 03.